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Abstract  
Europe for Europeans: Nationalism in the 21st Century 
 
Azad J. Niroomand 
 





The Syrian Refugee Crisis has become one of the greatest humanitarian issues of the 21st 
century. Millions of asylum seekers fleeing violence in the Middle East have arrived at the door 
step of the European Union seeking protection and a better life. A mass migration of this scale was 
not something that the national governments of the EU or the individual members states had been 
prepared for. Continental Europe has received over 1 million asylum applications and it is 
estimated that 3.3 million refugees are currently residing in Turkey, seeking asylum there or 
waiting their turn for admittance into the European Union. But a growing opposition to the influx 
of refugees has begun to endanger these resettlement programs and indeed has begun to undermine 
the ability of some states to create any effective policy. This paper will look at a variety of factors 
that have contributed to the modern emergence of nationalism in Europe.  
This study of nationalism is based on the role that nationalist leaders and their parties have 
played in defining policy with regards to Syrian migrants, how historical trends and the 
development of national identities now contribute to modern nationalist sentiment, and how the 
respective economic situations of the two case studies observed has shaped rhetoric surrounding 
migration. To accomplish this a dual method approach both qualitative and quantitative measures 
will be used. For the quantitative data, key metrics of economic strength will be used to compare 
the two case studies and develop an understanding of the impact the economy has on provoking 
nativist fears and contributing to anti-immigration rhetoric. The qualitative aspect utilizes 
historical accounts, government documents, and biographical data to develop a picture of what 
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each movement defines as “the nation” and the role that each leader has played in creating this 
ideology within their respective movement.  Ultimately, this thesis utilizes long standing theories 
on the origins of nationalistic movements and applies it to modern case studies in order to develop 
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How did the world go from the end of history and peace on earth to tribalist conflicts on 
all levels? At the end of the Cold War in 1992, Francis Fukayama published an article entitled 
“The End of History and the Last Man.” In it he articulated the ideology of the era, that communism 
had been defeated and now the neoliberal world order would reign supreme (Fukayama 1992). 
Conflicts would end and society would cease changing. We would all be encompassed within one 
global community. It was not long before the rise of Islamic extremism, intrastate conflict, and 
separatist movements quickly challenged this idyllic notion of societal progression. Out of this 
turmoil emerged another piece of sociological writing that sought to define and encapsulate the 
zeitgeist of the post-Cold War international order. In his book published just three years later in 
1995, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, Benjamin 
Barber suggests that the external forces that are moving humanity towards a harmonious future are 
themselves generating an internal pushback against this world order. This pushback manifests as 
tribalist factions that resist perceived globalist encroachment often times through violent means 
(Barber, 1995). The “Jihad” he describes include terrorism, nationalist sentiment, and increased 
hate crimes towards others. In essence it is the resurgence of an “Us vs. Them” mentality based on 
our most primal and basic divisions.  
 Today we have seen a resurgence of nationalism in every corner of the globe. It is not just 
the usual suspects of Europe and the Western World. We have seen nationalist movements emerge 
in China, South East Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Each region with vastly 
different cultures and histories but each now fostering a resentment towards those from the outside 
world. The disparity between the end of history and the rising wave of “jihad” is highlighted in the 
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global response to the Syrian Migrant Crisis. Europe, who claims to be the champion of the liberal 
world order and human rights, has now seen a resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in the 
wake of the Syrian civil war (Calamur, 2019). Less than a decade after receiving the Nobel Peace 
Prize for preventing conflict for 60 years, the European Union now finds itself embroiled with 
nationalist tensions. Brexit, and other emerging movements threaten the integrity of the European 
project. But the question remains, why now? What is happening in the world today that has caused 
this resurgence?  
This thesis seeks to argue that it is the unique political, economic, and social circumstances 
that have manifested in the 21st century that have caused this sudden reemergence of nationalist 
sentiment. These factors have provided the perfect context for nationalist leaders to craft rhetoric 
and policies establishing an “in group” and an “out group” specifically targeting Syrian Refugees 
with the ultimate goal of solidifying their own power. This thesis breaks down the social, 
economic, and political dimensions within each of the respective case studies to show how each 
has played a part in the formation of these imagined communities and contributed to the resurgence 
of nationalism in 21st century Europe. The political factors are the impact of nationalist leaders on 
the direction of their movements and the state as a whole. The social factors revolve around the 
development of the unique national identities in that now serve as the unifying force for 
contemporary nationalists. To understand these identities this paper will analyze the historical 
trends and events that over the past several centuries have led to the development of the French 
and Turkish national identities. Finally, the perceived economic threat that Syrian migrants pose, 
which appeals to peoples most base fears about financial security and personal well-being, will be 
compared to the economic realities within the two case studies. While this rhetoric has proven 
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effective at rallying a base, this paper will show it is ultimately derived from a warped and often 
entirely imagined perception of the national fiscal situation. 
Nationalistic sentiment held by a single individual is not in and of itself particularly 
dangerous to society or the greater political order. To become weaponized and dangerous, many 
individuals with similar nationalistic beliefs must coalesce under one banner and one organization. 
This is the role that is served by the leadership of nationalist parties. These charismatic leaders and 
their parties help create a uniform set of beliefs for their followers as well as providing political 
structure for effective mass mobilization. To achieve this goal they rely on stoking peoples most 
base fears and manipulating the facts of the world around them. 
The first mechanism used by nationalist leaders is the corruption of national identities in 
order to serve their own political agenda. Every nation has its own unique cultural history and 
identity, but this does not immediately spawn nationalist sentiment. It is only when this identity is 
presented as superior to others, and as under attack from another culture, that it can be used to rally 
a nationalist movement. This thesis will use the two selected case studies to highlight the 
development of their unique national identities and how they have been used today to rally 
nationalist support by creating exclusionary definitions of what it means to be French or Turkish.  
The second and most effective tactic used by nationalist leaders is the use of economic 
rhetoric. The classic appeal that nationalists most often make is based on what people fear most; 
financial uncertainty. Immigrants, and in the case of this thesis, Syrian refugees are painted as 
threats to the economic order and potential parasites on the social safety nets of the state. The 
rhetoric often uses messaging stating that this foreign group is coming to take jobs away from 
citizens or that they are coming to start lives as dependents on the state. This will inevitably result 
in individuals losing work and having no assistance from the government when they need it most. 
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Worst of all, nationalists will say, they do not contribute to these systems with taxes, etc. Here 
again we see a divergence from reality and the weaponization of fear and misinformation. Casting 
refugees as an external threat helps solidify who is a member of “the nation” and creates a common 
“enemy” for the populace to rally against. This thesis will show that not only is the economy not 
under threat from this influx of migrants, but this demographic shift actually has the potential to 
help support the aging workforces we see throughout Europe and much of the developed world.  
Fear is a powerful weapon and the ultimate tool of the nationalist, and no fear is more 
powerful than the fear of “the other”. With all the uncertainty generated by the Syrian Civil War 
and the Syrian Refugee Crisis, nationalist leaders in France and Turkey have taken advantage of 
the fear that many people within their states feel in order to solidify power for themselves and 
promote their own exclusionary agendas. This thesis breaks down the context for this rise and the 
methodology they have used to bring about this surge in nationalistic sentiment.  
1.1 Historical Context 
 
The “inciting incident” that began this upward trend in nationalist sentiment is the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis caused by the Syrian Civil War. In order to understand the increase in nationalism 
in Europe, it is important first to understand the historical background that has preceded this trend. 
The background leading up to the Syrian Civil War, causing the mass egress of citizens, provides 
vital insight into the mindset of the refugees and asylum seekers entering Europe. This war is often 
referred to as the first war caused by climate change, which gives the Syrians fleeing the war the 
new designation of climate refugees (Akbarzadeh, 2016). The war began once years of drought 
had depleted much of the rural food supply in the country. Farmers and villagers sought support 
from the government but found none. The requests quickly transitioned into protests and demands. 
The violent repression of these protests led to the emergence of several regional factions that 
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opposed the tyrannical rule of Bashar al-Assad (Akbarzadeh, 2016). One of these rebel factions 
was the extremists of ISIS. The civil war quickly erupted into an internationally backed conflict 
and years of fighting had ravaged the country. In search of safety and better living conditions, 
millions of Syrians left their homes behind and headed for Turkey and Europe. In total it is 
estimated that between 5-8 million refugees have fled into the countries around the Mediterranean 
and into Europe (Koroutchev, 2016). This mass migration has been called by some in the 
international community the greatest humanitarian crisis of our time (European Greens, 2019). 
Where these people will go, for how long, and what they will do when they get there has become 
the singular focus of many European nations and the greatest concern of modern nationalist 
movements. 
1.2 Case Studies 
 
When using two case studies in a comparative analysis, a method often used by political 
scientists is the “Most Similar/ Most Different Method” first outlined by John Stewart Mill in his 
book A System of Logic. This method of analysis functions by selecting two case studies that either 
are similar in almost every dimension except for one, this being “Most Similar”, or two case studies 
that are different in almost every dimension except one, this being “Most Different” (Mill 1949). 
The remaining variation between the two cases provides a single variable or small set of variables 
that can be studied in order to understand a potential relationship or potential causality within the 
two individual case studies (Mill 1949). In order to better understand the origins of contemporary 
nationalism in Europe, two case studies have been selected based on their “Most Different” 
criteria; France and Turkey. In most key aspects, these two case studies are quite different from 
one another. France is a free democracy, while Turkey is experiencing democratic backsliding 
(Eder, 2016). France is a predominantly Catholic nation, while Turkey is predominantly Sunni 
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Muslim. France has a robust economy, while Turkey has recently experienced several financial 
crises (Goodman, 2019). The “similar” dimension that is the focus of study for this paper is the 
almost concurrent rise of nationalist movements within both of these states in response to the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis. What this thesis will argue is that by studying this similarity amongst all 
their differences it becomes clear that nationalist leaders and their manipulation of national 
identities and use of protectionist economic rhetoric is what has caused the sudden reemergence 
of nationalism on such a large scale.  
Both of these states have been impacted by a large influx of Syrian refugees since the beginning 
of the crisis  (Koroutchev, 2016). Turkey now has the largest number of Syrian refugees in the 
world. As a Muslim nation, and the most proximate European country to Syria, Turkey has become 
to many the destination of their migration. Still others see Turkey merely as the gateway into 
Europe proper. Once here the ultimate destination of many of the migrants are western European 
nations with strong economies and generous social security schemes. This includes Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom. Of these France was selected to study based on its historical 
trends of marginalization and its powerful nationalist movement. These two studies provide very 
different views on the same problem, and immigrants coming from the same country have vastly 
different experiences interacting with the citizens. The rest of this section will provide a more in 
depth discussion of the variations between these two states. 
 Beginning firstly with France, its national history provides an interesting social dimension 
to the analysis. France, throughout its history, has prided itself on its unique and distinctive culture. 
This culture not only helps easily define the nation but now serves as a rallying ideology for the 
growing nationalist movement. Additionally, French society has continually been criticized for its 
failure to integrate various waves of immigrants. This has resulted in highly segregated living 
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spaces where white French citizens reside within inner cities and French people of color reside in 
the suburbs or as they are called the “banlieue.” This social norm of exclusion is key to 
understanding the uniquely French version of nationalism that we see manifesting in its political 
system today.  
 The Front National, recently renamed to the Rassamblement National, was the second most 
popular party in France’s 2017 presidential election (Wike, 2017). This dramatic swing from two 
terms of socialist governance to an election between the center right and far right highlights a 
dramatic social and political shift within France. This party is particularly interesting because it is 
not a new party. It has existed since the end of the second world war but was largely relegated to 
the status of a radical, pseudo-fascist group (Stockemer, 2017). Now it has come back with massive 
popularity after intense rebranding and redrafting of its central messages. Understanding the causes 
of this and its newfound support can help develop an understanding of this new wave of nationalist 
sentiment. Another aspect that makes France an excellent case study for analysis is its relationship 
with religion.  
 France has some of the strictest laws regarding the separation of church and state in the 
Western world. This policy forbids the display of any religious iconography while occupying a 
state role. This includes municipal workers, doctors, teachers, and even students. While this policy 
has been promoted as something that creates a cohesive and inoffensive society, the influx of 
Muslim immigrants has seen this policy take on a much more discriminatory role (Bowen, 2007). 
Forbidding the hijab or veil in public has become a central issue for secular France. Society is 
faced with the question of when does inclusion become discrimination in and of itself. The push 
for secularism also creates a paradox within French identity. Although the country has a relatively 
small population that actively practices any sort of religion, a vast majority identifies as catholic. 
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The historical relationship between Catholics and Muslims has also created a contentious dynamic 
between the nominally “Catholic” French and the devout Sunni Muslim Syrians.  
 One of the long-touted sources of nationalism is economics and fear of migrant workers. 
Many countries espouse the same xenophobic rhetoric claiming that immigrant populations and 
foreigners are coming to take the jobs of French nationals. Although refuted in countless academic 
discussions, the perception of immigrants taking jobs remains a powerful motivator in the minds 
of voting people (Wike, 2017). This is particularly true of those who occupy jobs that are lower 
skilled and more easily replaceable. France is a major economic figure within both the European 
Single Market and on the world stage in general (France OECD, 2019). This provides an 
interesting case where even without any tangible economic threat posed by migrants, one of the 
major pillars of the Front National has been the xenophobic lie of immigrants stealing jobs and tax 
resources that France cannot afford to pay. This thesis will analyze the economic realities in France 
and contrast them with the propaganda spread about the economic impact of migrants. Each of 
these social, political, and economic factors plays an important role in shaping the French 
perception and reaction to the Syrian Refugee Crisis.  
 The second case study, Turkey, was chosen specifically because of its divergence from 
France. In all the key aspects discussed above, Turkey provides different factors for analysis. 
Beginning firstly with the its national history, Turkey maintained a large contiguous empire 
throughout central Europe and the Middle East called the Ottoman Empire. Unlike many of the 
European colonizers, the territories held by Turkey largely shared the same religious background 
and those that did not were given various degrees of religious freedom (Kia, 2019). The Ottoman 
Empire and present-day Turkey are majority Sunni Muslim countries. In contrast to the European 
style of rule, the Ottomans expressed much more religious tolerance for the subjugated people. 
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While they had animosity and conflict with Christian subpopulations, they maintained amicable 
relations with Muslim communities (Kia, 2019). That is why Turkey is of particular interest for 
this thesis. Lacking the historical distaste for Muslim migrants and Muslim people, it is interesting 
to see such a wide spread rejection of Syrian migrants. Turkey also has a robust separation of 
religion and governance that was implemented after the fall of the Ottomans and the birth of the 
Republic of Turkey (Bay, 2011). The current president Recep Erdogan has slowly begun to erode 
these laws and the lines between the political and the religious has become increasingly blurred. 
At the same time as he has challenged “discrimination” against Muslims and has actively 
cultivated a cult of personality centered on traditional Muslim values, Erdogan has also been 
critical of Syrian migrants who belong to the same “Muslim brotherhood” that he has sought to 
develop (Kirdis, 2015). This means that there must be some other factor that is not religiously 
based playing a role in this discrimination. The disconnect between the rhetoric of Erdogan’s 
increasingly Islamic government and the reality of how they treat fellow Muslims also contributes 
to Turkey’s value as a case study. 
 Turkey has also demonstrated its own propensity to discriminate against migrant 
populations and fail to integrate minority groups. Today Syrians are forced to apply for asylum in 
the first city they enter and must remain in that governmental province unless relocated by the state 
(Economist, 2019). This greatly restricts the freedom of movement and ability to connect with 
family and community members. This coupled with the massive campaigns of forced deportation 
have increased anti-immigrant sentiment while simultaneously endangering the lives of the 
millions of Syrian Refugees in Turkey (Farooq, 2019). How this exclusion has contributed to the 
nationalist sentiment in Turkey provides another aspect of analysis for this thesis. 
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 Turkey also diverges greatly from France in terms of its economic performance. While 
considered a member of the “developed world” or Global North, Turkey is currently suffering 
from economic slowdown and rising unemployment that threatens to upend the entire global 
economic community (Turkey OECD, 2019). This contrast with the strong French economy can 
provide interesting data on how economic motivations may differ when the reality of employment 
and job security could be threatened by large swathes of cheap labor at a time when people have 
to work harder to make ends meet. With its authoritarian regime, primarily Muslim population, 
and faltering economic situation, Turkey provides an interesting look at how a country 
experiencing a parallel problem to France can have a vastly different response and still develop a 
nationalist opposition to migrant populations.  
1.3 Research Question(s) 
 
 
The essential purpose of this paper is to synthesize existing theories of nationalism and apply 
them to a contemporary example. Nationalism, xenophobia, islamophobia, and racism have existed 
for centuries before the Syrian migrant crisis. There is an extensive library of literature discussing 
the rise of nationalist governments and analyzing the contributing factors behind them. The global 
reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis allows for a contemporary application of this theory and the 
formation of a deeper understanding of this ongoing phenomenon. This thesis attempts to do that 
analysis to understand why we are seeing the reemergence of nationalism in these particular 
regions of the world and at this particular time, and by using the “Most Different” method of 
analysis, it becomes clear that both countries’ contemporary nationalist movements have followed 
a similar trajectory to rise in power and influence. The many facets of modern nationalism make 
it both extremely similar and markedly novel. One such change is that in both France and Turkey, 
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the current waves of nationalism are spearheaded by highly educated and affluent members of their 
respective societies (Stockemer, 2017). Indeed, this trend can be seen across Europe and across 
the globe. That is why understanding the role of leadership and other important social factors is 
necessary to understanding the modern emergence of nationalism. Understanding what defines the 
nation and who belongs to the nation is also at the heart of grasping this alarming trend. Why this 
resurgence has come about now and in direct response to the Syrian Refugee crisis is the main 
research question that this thesis will answer.  
1.4 Methodology  
 
 
This project utilizes both a qualitative and quantitative approach to analysis. The reasoning 
behind this “dual methodology” is that each form of analysis encapsulates different aspects of the 
reaction to refugees and provides unique insight into the problem at the center of discussion. 
Certain things within the qualitative spheres cannot be captured by hard data or statistical analysis 
that characterize quantitative analysis. Conversely, quantitative methods can provide insight into 
causal relationships and trends that a qualitative analysis cannot.  
 Within this paper, the primary qualitative methods being used are the analysis of 
propaganda, historical sources, and government publications. For the sake of this discussion, 
government publications includes speeches from politicians, party platforms released by 
candidates, and press releases from government offices or ministries. The governments that these 
are sourced from are France, Turkey, and the European Union. Since France is a member state of 
this supra-national organization, it has an impact on the policies developed by the EU and vice 
versa. The goal with analyzing these pieces is to develop an understanding of the perception of 
Syrian migrants and the overall Syrian refugee crisis. How people view their economic impact. 
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What political threats people believe they pose. The policy initiatives crafted in order to prepare 
for the influx and subsequently to deal with the influx are central to understanding the mindset of 
people within France and Turkey. Historical accounts provide a context for the concept of “the 
nation” as well as helping to explain the impact that certain trends have on leadership, parties, and 
government initiatives in both Turkey and France.   
Examples of government publications includes press releases and policy statements from 
France, Turkey, and the European Union. Marine le Pen and the Rassamblement National 
published 144 policy initiatives and actions they would take had they won the presidency 
(Rassemblement National, 2016). This provides a substantive look at what nationalist governance 
and parties look like outside of the redundant racist and xenophobic things that are commonly 
circulated in the press. These provide insights into what particular aspects of the migrant crisis are 
most concerning to those who support these parties beyond the primal fear of “the other.” It is also 
important to reiterate that these are merely the perceptions that people have formed and that 
governments are presenting. That is why such a significant emphasis has been placed on having 
both the qualitative and quantitative aspects to the project.  
 The quantitative methods used provide insight into the actual impacts that the Syrian 
refugees have had on France and Turkey. In some sense providing a “reality check” for many of 
the perceptions developed and analyzed by the qualitative methods. For this paper the quantitative 
methods consist primarily of economic metrics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross 
National Income (GNI), Unemployment, and GDP per capita. These will help explain the reality 
of the financial situation in each country as well as providing some rationale behind the policies 
and programs proposed by modern nationalist movements. Much of the nationalist literature 
focuses on the economic impacts that migrants have whether it’s by directly taking jobs, or by 
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utilizing state social programs without contributing the proper taxes. Economic figures should 
show that the reality of the situation is very different from the perception and propaganda used to 
describe it. This can then lead into a discussion into the origins of these differences and how they 
can possibly be reconciled. Again, ultimately the function of the quantitative section is to 
counterbalance the qualitative section. Quantitative evidence provides insight into the reality and 
causes surrounding the influx of refugees that qualitative research cannot. These complimentary 
elements develop a much clearer picture than either in isolation.   
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2.0 Nationalism and the Nation State 
 
Any discussion of contemporary nationalism must first begin with defining what is meant 
by nationalism. Nationalism and the idea of the nation-states have their roots in both political and 
philosophical definitions. In his work Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson highlights that 
there is no one universal definition of nationalism (Anderson, 1983). Unlike many other terms in 
political science such as racism, sexism, and xenophobia, nationalism has no encapsulating 
definition. While it can be identified and studied through the analysis of case studies, the field still 
lacks one unified understanding on nationalism. In order to develop a functional definition of 
nationalism to be used in this discussion, first the history of the modern nation state must be 
understood. This section will summarize the prevailing theories about state development, the 
origins of nations, and the process through which nation-states are formed and recognized. The 
goal is that these processes and definitions can be contrasted with the arbitrary nature of “the 
nation” that is focused upon by nationalist movements. What this section shows is both the political 
and philosophical aspects to the emergence of the nation-state and how this can contribute to the 
rise of nationalism. The discussion on the evolution of the nation state will explain how groups of 
unorganized people coalesce in one geographic space under one central authority, and the 
discussion of Anderson’s work will explain how this political organization develops its own 
cultural identity and unifying ideology to become an imagine community (Anderson, 1983). The 
structures of leadership, economic systems and priorities, as well as the national identity created 
by these imagined communities can ultimately serve as the roots of nationalism. 
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2.1 Defining Nation States and Understanding their Development 
 
 
Inexorably linked to the study of nationalism is the observation of the nation state. In 
modern international relations theory, the nation state is one of the most commonly referred to 
units of organization for political entities. It encapsulates both cultural and political dimensions of 
society. The nation is a group or community of individuals who identify with a similar language, 
shared heritage, or religious/cultural practices. In a majority of groups, a nation also revolves 
around a shared ethnic or tribal background but there are several notable exceptions, namely the 
United States. The concept of the state also has many competing definitions and theories on their 
development. For this discussion, the definitions of a state is outlined in Political Geography by 
Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey. They outline five characteristic that are essential for a political 
organization to achieve modern state hood. 
According to Painter and Jeffrey states are: 
1. Ordered by precise boundaries with administrative control across the whole; 
2. Occupy large territories with control given to organized institutions; 
3. Have a capital city that is endowed with symbols that embody state power;  
4. The government within the state creates organizations to monitor, govern, and control its 
population through surveillance and record keeping; 
5. They increase monitoring over time. 
Now these criteria can be applied to the two case studies of this paper in order to evaluate if 
they meet this definition of statehood. Beginning firstly with France, although they are members 
of the European Union and have unrestricted travel in accordance with the Schengen Agreement, 
the French government still has precise borders with administrative control. They also have a large 
bureaucratic apparatus established to aid in governance as well as surveillance and record keeping. 
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The capital city of Paris is home to the presidential residence, the parliament, and other cultural 
sites that embody the history and power of the French state. 
Focusing now on Turkey, it is evident that Turkey also easily meets the criteria laid out by 
Painter and Jeffrey. The geographical boundaries of Turkey are clearly defined and well 
recognized. The government has administrative control over all parts of the country and has 
various branches and organizations that oversee day to day governance. The capital of Istanbul is 
home to political and cultural sites that embody the power and history of the state. Finally, the 
Turkish government possess the ability to surveil and keep records on those within its borders.  
While the status of these two states may seem common knowledge and this exercise may seem 
unnecessary, it is important to establish the link between the nation-state and nationalism when 
discussing contemporary nationalist movements. It also opens up the possible exploration of 
nationalism within groups that do not belong to a recognized state, a topic that will be discussed 
later.  
2.2 The Evolution and Creation of the State 
 
 
The characteristics, and modern states do not simply emerge out of nothing, there is often long 
histories and processes that over time result in the formation of a recognizable state. The study of 
the formation of these states also produces four major theories on the development of states. Of 
the many theories articulated in the literature, three stand out as the most widely accepted and 
discussed: the Force theory, the Divine Right theory, and the Social Contract theory. 
Beginning first with the Force theory, one of the most notable thinkers within this school of 
though is Max Weber. Weber defines the state as being the actor with “a monopoly of legitimate 
physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919). Within this framework the state emerges 
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from many feuding factions as the sole group that can maintain order throughout the geographical 
boundaries identified with the state. In order for this governing structure to be recognized as a 
legitimate state, the area that they lay claim too must be free of other armed factions or groups 
claiming legitimate authority. In the presence of these groups, the state must demonstrate an ability 
to suppress them and maintain control.  
The Divine Right theory, while not as commonly cited today, also remains prevalent in the 
literature of state formation. Many theocratic or monarchical systems use the reasoning of divine 
intervention to justify power and statehood. God, or some other divine being, ordained that a 
particular person or family should rule over a granted area without question. While this has obvious 
implications within states that have a monarch it also has profound impact in how states relate to 
one another, can redefine what it means to be a nation, and plays a vital impact on the development 
of nationalism.  
In World Order, Kissinger outlines the Islamic world and China’s diverging viewpoints on the 
international community. Much like the Christian crusaders before who viewed the world in the 
dichotomy of Christendom and uncivilized savages, many Islamic oriented countries were founded 
with a similar mentality (Kissinger, 2014). All claimed to have the divine right as the true inheritors 
of Mohamad’s expansive Muslim empire and all were founded with the idea of unifying the 
Islamic world under one flag. All other outsiders were viewed as non-believers and antithetical to 
this world view. While the geopolitical realities and interactions between primarily Muslim 
countries tell a different story, this rallying around an abstract religious ideal is one mechanism of 
state formation. Similarly, China since ancient times has viewed itself as “the Middle Kingdom.” 
This made them the literal center of the Universe and the cultural pinnacle of human civilization. 
While the notion of the rule gaining their power through the “Edict of Heaven” this idea of 
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centrality and superiority still permeate through China and are reflected in their foreign policies 
(Kissinger, 2014). One could even argue that the Colonial United States was settled with a similar 
notion of Divine Right. The first colonists came seeking to settle a New Zion and become a 
“shining city on a hill”; a quote later reused by President Reagan. 
The third theory relevant to this discussion of nation forming is the Social Contract Theory. 
This theory’s most relevant author is Thomas Hobbes and It is best articulated in his book: 
Leviathan. This theory argues that people tend to willing organize into larger and larger groups, 
sacrificing personal freedoms, because of the security and other benefits they get from being part 
of the collective. Hobbes illustrates this trade off in Leviathan by explaining that the formation of 
“a commonwealth” by the people is mutually agreed upon in order to escape the savagery of the 
state of nature (Leviathan 1651).  Political theorists within this school argue that the same process 
plays out on a much larger scale over time with the formation of nation states. 
The other theories are less commonly used and much less relevant to the discussion of this 
thesis. What all of these theories highlight is the constructed nature of the nation. While various 
philosophers and political scientists throughout time have attempted to grasp what it means to be 
a nation and a nation state, ultimately it is an arbitrary distinction granted by people and political 
bodies. With the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe there has been an increased focus on 
preserving the “nation” and the state from these foreign populations. The next two sections will 
explain the political process that a nation must undergo to receive recognition of its legitimacy, 
followed by a continued discussion on Anderson’s concept of the nation and nationalism. The 
function of understanding these political processes is to again highlight the arbitrary nature of what 
define a nation or nation-state so that this can later be contrasted with the argumentation of 
nationalists that the nation and the state are concrete objects that must be preserved. 
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2.3 Sovereignty and International Order 
 
 
 When a governing structure controls a territory in which all the subjects, or the vast 
majority, belong to one singular national identity this is considered a nation state (Weber, 1919). 
While this is now the accepted unit for international relations, this model of sovereign governance 
emerged relatively recently in human history (Kissinger, 2014). Within the international order 
there are also several examples of nations who exist without a recognized state. Notable examples 
of this phenomenon are the Kurds, Palestinians, and some scholars would also include separatist 
movements like the Chechens and Catalonians. These groups have a shared cultural history, social 
identity, and often unique languages or dialects, yet they lack a formal state structure. These 
stateless nations provide interesting case studies in state development as their quest for statehood 
helps illustrate the process that many states go through. Of course there is no official list of 
requirements that lead to recognized statehood. The current system is based solely around 
previously recognized states acknowledging and recognizing new states as legitimate (Kissinger, 
2014). This typically results in membership in the United Nations if a majority of existing member 
states approve them. Palestine, Kosovo, and Taiwan stand out as potential nation states that have 
been recognized by some in the United Nations but still remain in limbo. Yet these stateless nations 
are just as real and just as tangible to their members as any other imagined collective that exists on 
the world stage. This makes them equally capable of creating a common national identity and even 
forming their own nationalist ideologies. The next section continues the conversation with 
Anderson’s book Imagined Communities which explains the arbitrary nature of the nation and the 
emergence of nationalism.  
 




In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is “an imagined 
political community—and imagined as both inherently sovereign and limited” (Anderson, 1983). 
He goes on to elaborate that nations are imagined in the sense that the ties that bind the members 
of the community are invisible and imagined. It is some share history, some shred cultural value 
that creates a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1983). It is important to note here as well 
that the use of the word imagined should not be interpreted as fake, rather it emphasizes the ethereal 
nature of what defines and composes a nation. As Anderson defines it “the arbitrariness of their 
inclusion and juxtaposition…shows the linkage between them is imagined” (Anderson, 1983).  
Another important aspect to Andersons theory is the relationships created between 
members of the nation. He points out that although it is likely impossible for every member of the 
nation to know every other member personally, they still feel a sense of connection and 
comradeship simply because of their perceived inclusion in the same imagined community. This 
can also have the reverse effect where members of one nation can feel threatened by another person 
solely on the basis that they do not belong to the same imagined community. This dynamic will be 
of particular importance later on in this discussion. Anderson points to the unity and exclusion 
created by imagined communities. Ideals and values arbitrarily create an “in” group and an “out” 
group that not only define the nation but serve to inspire nationalist sentiment. According to 
Anderson, people not in one particular group are often treated with suspicion and animosity by 
members of “the nation” (Anderson, 1983). This creates the phenomenon referred to as 
nationalism. 
This paper will use historical and biographical data to explain the creation and 
manipulation of “the nation” in both Turkey and French. Subsequent chapters will use historical 
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trends to identify the key characteristics of both the French and Turkish national identity. Equally 
important is understanding the perceived leaders of these nations and their modern nationalist 
movements. The common ideals of these imagined communities serve as the rallying ideology for 
nationalists, and the leaders of each of these movements play an important role in defining the “in” 
and “out” groups that shape nationalistic rhetoric and policy.  
 A subcomponent of this particular strain of nationalism that has been observed in the 21st 
century is the ethnocentric nature of the rhetoric. There is a distinct division between the members 
of that state or the proper citizens in society and the foreign invaders. This ethnic element to the 
discrimination is an important factor in not only understanding how this current wave manifests 
itself but also to understanding the origins of 21st century nationalism. Along with this ethnic 
component, another component of interest is the religious component. The majority Christian 
composition of Europe’s population creates an contentious dynamic with the predominantly 
Muslim immigrant population. Contributing to this most recent wave of nationalism is 
islamophobia. Islamophobia, in the terms of this discussion, is defined as a fear or negative bias 
towards people who practice Islam. The role that religion plays will be discussed when the origins 
of each countries national identity is discussed.  Of particular interest is the interplay of religion 




Closely linked to the discussion of contemporary nationalism is populism. Much like 
nationalism, populism is another term that has been notoriously difficult to define. Cas Mudde, a 
notable scholar in the field of populism explains that based on the regions of the globe or the time 
period during which you examine populism, it can denote wildly different concepts (Mudde, 
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2017). The current and most widely accepted definition put forth by Mudde, and the one that shall 
be used in this discussion of contemporary nationalism, frames populism as an ideational approach. 
This means that populism is represented more as an ideology or discourse rather than a concrete 
political phenomenon (Mudde, 2017).  
The three core components, outlined by Mudde, that make up this definition are the people, 
the elite and the general will (Mudde, 2017). This concept of “the people” is rather similar to 
Anderson’s conception of “the nation” in his book. It revolves around creating an exclusionary “in 
group” that are all united by certain characteristics who make up the constituency of populist 
leaders and parties (Mudde, 2017). The people possess within them the second major concept of 
populism: the general will. This abstract notion serves as the manifesto of populist leaders. They 
live to enact the general will of the people and present their policies as the codification of society’s 
desires (Mudde, 2017). Mudde warns that this is where the dark side of populism can emerge.  
Leaders may use the banner of the general will to create authoritarian policies and craft legislation 
that harms those who are not regarded as part of “the people” (Mudde, 2017)  For this discussion, 
the concept of those who are a part of “the people” and those who are not is largely the same as 
the arbitrary division between members of “the nation” and those who exist outside of it. The last 
of the three central pillars is the concept of “the elite.” This faceless enemy is often the prime target 
of populist movements. The elite are often presented as working for the interests of an outside or 
“alien group” or even representing an outside group themselves (Mudde, 2017). The connection 
between this populism and nationalism is clear. Both rely on creating an in group, whether 
classified as “the nation” or “the people”,  and an out group classified as either “the elite” or a 
foreign threat. Both of these movements also justify their actions by appealing to the general will 
of the people or by saying that they act as the protectors of the nation. The nationalist movements 
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that have reemerged in France and Turkey rely on populist ideologies and an appeal to “the 
common people.” 
 Marine Le Pen has described the European Union as an army of elite bureaucrats who do 
not act in the interest of the French people (Rassemblement National, 2016). This highlights her 
use of populist ideology to fuel her nationalist movement. In the Turkish example, Erdogan has 
repeatedly denounced any opposition to his government as intervention from unknown outside 
forces. He has increasingly cracked down on journalists and outspoken critics accusing them of 
acting as agents of an outside threat (Eder, 2016). The utilization of populist ideologies have 
contributed to the effective mobilization and reemergence of nationalism in 21st century Europe. 
2.6 Propaganda as a Tool for Nationalist Movements 
 
 
The method through which political leaders and movements convey their ideologies and 
amass supporters is by using propaganda. In order to fully understand the rise of nationalism in 
contemporary Europe, it is essential to understand what the term propaganda means.  While this 
term is used frequently in popular media and political discourse, its connotation varies greatly. A 
widely accepted and applicable definition of propaganda can be found in Edward Bernays’ seminal 
work Propaganda from 1928. This largely unchallenged text has stood as the benchmark for the 
study of propaganda and political communication. In it, Bernays argues that people seek 
organization in the chaos of everyday life, and often look for “short cuts” on how to make decisions 
(Bernays, 1928). Propaganda is any form of communication that is meant to quickly provide 
information to a consumer and to influence that person’s opinion on a certain issue (Bernays, 
1928). Notably, this definition removes the negative connotation often associated with 
propaganda. In the political arena, politicians often use the term propaganda to dismiss the 
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messaging of their opponents as false or inherently misleading, but Bernays’ definition highlights 
that all political communications are propaganda because they are designed to influence how 
people view a certain issue (Bernays, 1928).   
 Using this definition of propaganda, this discussion of nationalism will highlight policy 
proposals, campaign posters, and other messaging tactics used by nationalist leaders in Europe in 
order to gather support from the electorate and promote nationalist ideologies. The two most 
effective propaganda campaigns undertaken in France and Turkey have been reshaping the 
national identity to form a more exclusionary definition, and the use of refugees and migrants as 
scape goats for perceived economic downturn. The messaging and propaganda utilized in France 




The concept of the nation, nationalism, and nationhood have always been notoriously difficult 
to define but this section has outlined a historical, political, and philosophically based working 
definition that will serve as the foundation for analysis and discussion. Key to the analysis in this 
thesis is understanding the ideals that comprise the nation, how the political leadership in each 
case study impacts the direction of the movement, and what propaganda is used to rally supporters 
around specific issues. For this paper the primary issues discussed are economically based such as 
impact on employment, social services, and overall economic health. This chapter has created a 
benchmark definition for analysis that can help answer the research questions fundamental to 
understanding the rise of nationalism in the 21st century. 
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3.0 French Nationalist Leadership 
 
 
 What creates nationalist movements is when members of “the nation” begin to take actions 
against those who are perceived to be outsiders. Often times individuals can possess nationalistic 
sentiments and have discriminatory tendencies. Achieving the wide spread nationalistic fervor that 
can be observed today around the globe requires a centralized leadership structure. This 
centralization of authority can help define the movement, rally support, and more effectively 
disseminate nationalist messaging. This can take the form of an individual leader or a party whose 
platform is rooted in nationalist ideology. Often nationalist leaders, like populist leaders, rely on a 
cult of personality and their own charisma to help unite supporters under one banner. This section 
will take a look at the origins of France’s far-right nationalist party, Front National, and its current 
leader who has attempted to bring its message of discrimination into main stream political 
discourse. What this ultimately reveals is the emergence of Marine Le Pen as the charismatic leader 
of the far-right in France and the process by which she rebranded her party to most effectively take 
advantage of the fear and uncertainty in France during the Syrian Refugee Crisis.  
3.1 Biography of Marine Le Pen 
 
 
Marine Le Pen was born on August 5, 1968 in a commune just outside of Paris (Tasch, 2017). 
Her father is Jean-Marie Le Pen, the original founder of the Front National party, and she is the 
youngest of his three daughters (Tasch, 2017). The radical and unpopular nature of her father’s 
political party made her childhood lonely and isolated. At some points in her life she had to leave 
Paris for the south of France because the volume of death threats became a safety concern for the 
Le Pen family (Tasch, 2017). It was not just verbal and written threats made against the family but 
acts of physical violence as well. In 1976 a bomb meant to kill the entire Le Pen family exploded 
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in the middle of the night in their Paris apartment (Beardsley, 2017). In her own autobiography Le 
Pen claims that this incident changed her life forever by demonstrating the power of her enemies 
and the lengths people would go to in order silence her family (Beardsley, 2017).  
As a young adult she earned her master’s in law from Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas in 
1991 and worked as a lawyer until 1998 (Tasch, 2017). She then began work in the Front 
National’s legal department following her father into the field of politics (Tasch, 2017). Le Pen 
quickly rose through the ranks of the party and in 2011 took over as its head from her father (Tasch, 
2017). This created a further schism in her and her father’s already contentious relationship as she 
attempted to overhaul the party’s image (Tasch, 2017). As leader of the party she has single 
handedly rebranded the party’s platform and firmly cemented herself as the face of the party and 
the far-right movement in France (Beardsley, 2017).  
It is important to note however that Marine Le Pen is not the leader of the French government 
and RN still holds very little political sway on the national level.  The focus on her as a political 
figure is primarily based on her notoriety and popularity as the face of nationalism in France. Even 
after making it to the second round of the presidential election, she only won a third of the popular 
vote. While not an insignificant portion of the population, a vast majority of French voters rejected 
her nativist message in favor of the more moderate center-right Macron and his party “Republique 
En Marche.” Macron’s party has taken a much less nativist approach to handling the influx of 
asylum seekers.  In 2018, Macron’s party passed a policy that cut down the maximum wait time 
for asylum claims and also increased access to vital integration programs (Hilliar, 2018). While 
parts of this policy have been denounced by the left in France as de facto methods of limiting 
immigration, it is still much more pro-immigrant than the RN’s calls for a temporary immigration 
ban (Hilliar, 2018).  
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While Marine Le Pen and her party serve as the face of French nationalism, it is important to 
remember that they exist primarily as an opposition party and not as the ruling regime in 
government. This is not to minimize the impact that their malicious rhetoric has had on the general 
political discourse in France, but rather to contextualize the limitations of their impact on actual 
policy making and implementation on the national level. The next two sections will discuss the 
history of the Front National, and the reforms that Marine Le Pen has made in order to increase 
the party’s popularity.  
3.2 History of Front National and Rassemblement National 
 
 
The Front National (FN), which today has been rebranded as the Rassemblement National 
(RN), has been the embodiment of far-right politics in France for almost five decades. The party 
was founded in 1972 by Marine Le Pens father, Jean-Marie Le Pen in an effort to unite the many 
scattered and disorganized far-right movements (Stockemer, 2017).  This party emerged during 
the aftermath of the Algerian War and that event served as the original unifying cause for the 
disorganized far-right. Le Pen and many of the early members of FN were unhappy with Charles 
de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw French troops and colonial authority from Algeria and FN 
emerged as a far-right Anti-Gaullist movement (Stockemer, 2017). As its leader he defined a clear 
nationalist, socially conservative, and anti-immigrant platform (Stockemer, 2017). The radical 
nature of the party and its discriminatory policies kept it largely in the margins of political 
discourse for much of its early history and earned Jean-Marie the nickname “the devil of the 
Republic” in popular media (Stockemer, 2017). The wide-spread use of anti-Semitic rhetoric and 
controversial opinions on the holocaust and World War II in his speeches ostracized many French 
voters and earned Front National its reputation as a radical right wing party (Stockemer, 2017).  
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Front National (FN) has maintained that the nation is a concrete place and structure rather than 
an abstract idea, similar to Anderson’s definition of the nation, and that the nation must be 
defended from foreign invaders who seek to destroy French culture and society (Stockemer, 2017). 
This platform failed to gain much support for the first decade of the parties existence but in the 
1980’s as the most western countries began to see a right-ward shift in the political spectrum, 
France also moved away from its left leaning parties and more towards the center presenting a 
unique opportunity for Le Pen and FN (Stockemer, 2017). Several municipal elections saw 
members of FN elected to city councils and after petitioning the federal government FN began to 
receive air time on TV and radio for their political ads (Stockemer, 2017). This led to an increase 
in national support for the party which culminated in FN winning 10 seats during the 1984 
European Elections (Stockemer, 2017). In 1988 Le Pen won 14% of votes in the presidential 
election, a previously unthinkable feat (Stockemer, 2017).  
Support for FN has risen and fallen based on a variety of factors impacting the country. With 
his daughter Marine Le Pen taking control of the party in 2011 and undertaking massive reform 
and rebranding efforts, the party has slowly begun to increase in general popularity (Piser, 2019). 
In France’s most recent election, which occurred in the wake of several terrorist attacks carried 
out by Islamic extremists, FN received its highest electoral support ever and Marine Le Pen was 
one of two candidates who made it to the second round. Although she lost to Emmanuel Macron’s 
centrist party “Republique En Marche,” Le Pen and her party managed to win 33% of the national 
vote in the second round (Wike, 2017). In 2018, Front National was officially rebranded to 
Rassemblement National (RN), or National Rally in English, in an attempt to create further 
distance from the controversial origins of Jean-Marie Le Pen and to continue to ride the newfound 
wave of support garnered in 2017 (Piser, 2019). 
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 It appears as though in times of economic or political turmoil, FN finds its greatest increases 
in support. The nationalistic messaging resonates more with the French people when they 
perceived their livelihoods or indeed lives to be threatened by “foreign invaders.” The anti-EU, 
anti-Muslim rhetoric were effective rallying cries in the wake of the Euro-zone crisis and the series 
of terrorist attacks in France. By attempting to link the Syrian Refugee crisis to Islamic extremism 
Marine Le Pen and her party have found a consistent source of fear and hatred that they hope will 
continue to motivate the French people to support the newly rebranded RN. 
3.3 The New Face of French Nationalism 
 
 
As alluded two in the previous sections, Marine Le Pen has made a conscious effort to make 
FN/RN’s message more “palatable” to the French people (Stockemer, 2017). Her efforts appear to 
be largely successful as RN continues to win municipal elections and seats in the European 
Parliament, but many critics have argued that the ideology and message of RN has not changed 
from its discriminatory roots, but rather have just changed vocabulary and rhetoric (Piser, 2019). 
This section will analyze the steps taken by Le Pen to rebrand her father’s party and will show that 
the same nationalistic sentiment that led to its founding in 1972 is alive and well within 
Rassemblement National. 
The first major effort that Le Pen took was ousting many of the more vocal anti-Semites within 
the party in an attempt to “de-demonize” the image of Front National (Tasch, 2017). This included 
the removal of many of her father’s longtime friends and supporters and eventually Jean-Marie Le 
Pen himself (Tasch, 2017). Her father’s exit from the public eye was presented as a sign that the 
party was changing into a more progressive and inclusive platform, but the reality is that even with 
those members gone, these discriminatory ideologies were not purged from the voters who 
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continued to support the party. The specific demographics and beliefs of FN/RN voters is detailed 
in the next section. Additionally, the anti-Semitic rhetoric was replaced by increased anti-Muslim 
rhetoric (Stockemer, 2017). This too was done in fashion to make the party outwardly appear less 
offensive. In contrast to the overt anti-Muslim rhetoric of her father, Marine Le Pen uses dog 
whistling tactics to convey the same message. By using the French policy of secularism known as 
“Laïcité” that will be discussed in more detail later, she has targeted French Muslims and Muslim 
immigrants who wear hijabs and display other religious symbols (Alduy, 2015). This shift in 
rhetoric allows RN to deflect criticisms of racism and claim that they simply want legal compliance 
with pre-existing laws. This is part of her efforts to make Syrians and Muslim immigrants from 
the EU and beyond the new target and “enemy of the nation” for supporters of RN to focus on.  
Additionally, the nationalist rhetoric of RN has decreased direct focus on immigration and 
instead speaks more towards concerns about the European Union and the ominous and omnipresent 
“Elites” which again serve as dog whistling messages directed against Syrians and other Muslim 
migrants (Alduy, 2016). Le Pen has become one of the loudest voices in the “Euroscepticism” 
movement which criticizes the EU for eroding sovereignty of the member states and being ruled 
by elite bureaucrats who operate independently from the will of the people (Stockemer, 2017). Of 
course this criticism of the supra-national organization also includes criticisms of its immigration 
policy claiming that it reduces Frances ability to control its borders and protect French citizens 
from foreign threats (Alduy, 2015). Again, these are examples of policies that do not seem to 
directly target the Syrian refugee population in the EU, but ultimately impact them most severely.  
These changes represent surface level alterations to the party’s platform and image in an 
attempt to garner more popular support. While Marine Le Pen has been somewhat successful in 
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making RN seem more like a far-right conservative party instead of the radical nationalist group 
of her father, the substance and ideology of the party have not substantially been changed. 
3.4 Demographics of French Nationalists 
 
 
Aside from the policies and initiatives undertaken by RN and Marine Le Pen, it is also 
important to understand the demographics and viewpoints of the French voters who support RN. 
Richard Wike of the Pew Research Center published a study where he discussed the positions and 
demographics of FN voters. His study asked participants whether or not they had a favorable view 
of Front National and then broke up respondents by other characteristics (Wike, 2017). He firstly 
points out that men without a college degree who identify as catholic are more likely than other 
groups to have a favorable opinion of Front National (Wike, 2017). This is in line with Marine Le 
Pen’s alleged “preference” for white, Christian French people over other groups (Alduy, 2015). 
Wike also found that those who favor Front National are more likely to express negative attitudes 
towards Muslims and have higher concerns that refugees are an economic burden as well as a 
threat to national security (Wike, 2017). This is reflected in Le Pen’s platform for the last election 
where she outlined plans to reduce immigration and restrict non-citizens’ access to government 
assistance programs (Rassemblement National, 2016). Wike’s study also found that those who 
hold a favorable view of Front National tend to be more skeptical of globalization and hold a less 
favorable view of the European Union (Wike, 2017). These views are again reflected in Le Pen’s 
“anti-globalist” and Eurosceptic rhetoric (Stockemer, 2017).  
 What this information shows is that the messaging put out by Le Pen and RN has an 
audience in France and their policies speak to the concerns of some French people. Le Pen is 
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4.0 French National Identity 
 
 
In the previous section about the origins of nationalism and the nation state, it was emphasized 
that a nation is a group that congregates around an ideology or set of cultural values that abstractly 
represent “the nation.” To continue analysis into the reemergence of nationalist sentiment in the 
21st century, this section will apply these principles by attempting to synthesize what ideological 
framework is the basis of the modern French nation and how Syrian migrants have been excluded 
from this imaging of the nation. The first component of this is understanding the “shared history” 
that serves as the foundation for French national identity. Next it is important to discuss the unique 
French culture that forms part of imagined community. This includes aspects such as religion, 
language, identity, etc., and each component will be dissected and expanded upon in this section. 
By focusing on certain elements of this national identity and crafting an exclusionary version of 
the French shared history, nationalists like Marine Le Pen and RN in France have been able to 
rally supporters around what they present as the “true French” identity against the wave of “foreign 
Syrian invaders.”  
4.1 Origins and History 
 
The question of when the French nation began is a complicated one. King Clovis I is the 
first monarch to refer to himself as “King of the Franks” in 509 AD after he united the many 
competing Frankish tribes who lived within the borders of modern France (Horne, 2004). Others 
point to the ancient tribe of Gauls who used to reside within the modern borders of France as the 
cultural ancestors to the modern French nation (Horne, 2004). What both of these groups, the 
Franks and the Gauls, have in common is that they have largely defined themselves in contrast to 
the major groups around them. Their identity was largely formed around their independence and 
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separation from other hegemonic groups around them.  For the Gauls this enemy manifested in the 
form of the Roman Empire. The Romans faced some of their fiercest opposition from the Gauls as 
they attempted to spread their influence and power across the ancient world. This resistance 
culminated in a series of struggles known as the Gallic Wars which took place from 58 BC to 50 
BC and resulted in the ultimate defeat of the Gauls (Horne, 2004). After they were forced into life 
under Roman rule, the Gauls still worked to preserve their unique culture even as they politically 
became another province of the vast Roman Empire.  
The Franks too had a complex relationship with the romans early in their history. They 
found themselves allied with or fighting against the Romans depending on the region, conflict, and 
local leadership (Horne, 2004). Once they were united under Clovis I they adopted a new trait that 
set the apart from other nations around them: Christianity. Clovis was the first Frankish/French 
ruler to become baptized in the Christian church which made the Franks the first Christianized 
tribe on a still largely pagan continent. As previously discussed in the section concerning the 
origins of nationalism, Anderson highlights religion as one of the unifying traits of a nation 
(Anderson, 1983). Becoming the first Christian tribe allowed the nascent French nation to unify 
around their newfound religion and also allowed members of this nation to clearly define the “in” 
group and the “out” group. For this reason, many historians and cultural anthropologists point to 
Clovis I and his kingdom as the birth of the French nation and the time when the seeds of French 
nationalism were planted. More on the role of religion and its impact on nationalist ideologies will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
Clovis I began a long line of French monarchs from many different families with a variety 
of religious and political affiliations. With the execution of Louis XVI the first Republic was born 
and the identity of the nation fundamentally changed. No longer did the monarch and their cultural 
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values define the ideology of the nation and the republican ideal of secularism removed the 
influence of any future leader’s religion. With the advent of democratic representation, “Liberté, 
Égalité, et Fraternité” became the rallying cry of the French People (Horne, 2004). New national 
heroes such as Marat, or the fictitious Marianne became key components of the French national 
identity. The modern red, white, and blue French flag called the “Tricolour” replaced the white 
flag of monarchical France (Horne, 2004). The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
became the founding document for the new nation state (Horne, 2004). As discussed previously, 
the development and acceptance of these new national symbols redefined the culture of the nation 
state and shifted the ideals focused on by nationalists. 
Now in its Fifth republic, French identity continues to remain strongly tied to the ideals of 
the Revolution but has also evolved to incorporate new ideas. After the second world war the new 
idea repeated throughout society was “Solidarity” (Milhaud, 2010). After the physical, economic, 
and human destruction experienced during the German occupation and subsequent liberation the 
country rallied together to rebuild their homes and lives. This time period saw the birth of France’s 
expansive social welfare system as well as their universal healthcare system that to this day is a 
major source of pride for French citizens (Milhaud, 2010). Today there is still a Ministry of 
Solidarity and Health that helps oversee the massive bureaucratic structure that makes up the 
French social security system.  
Each of these historical changes have contributed a piece to the modern French national 
identity. In the modern era the most significant change has come with France’s membership in the 
European Union. Since the birth of the EU’s predecessor, the European Coal and Steel 
Community, France has positioned itself as a key member state on the European continent (Pinder, 
2007). To many French officials and people, the European Project is the end result of French efforts 
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and French leadership. This idea was pervasive in the 1960’s that Charles de Gaulle twice vetoed 
the United Kingdom’s application for membership. While he claimed it was due to political and 
economic concerns that he believed would damage the integrative project, many historians believe 
this was his attempt to maintain France’s superiority in the Union (Pinder, 2007). Today, in light 
of Brexit, it seems that once again France is emerging as a key member state in the European 
Union. The integrative progress made by the European Union have not been universally lauded by 
all French citizens.  The Rassemblement National and other “Eurosceptic” groups have argued that 
the EU has actually decreased French sovereignty and watered down the French national identity 
(Rassemblement National, 2016). As the Gauls and Franks had defined themselves in contrast with 
other around them, French nationalists have attempted to define themselves in contrast to the idea 
of European citizenship and continue to fight for their French identity (Stockemer, 2017).  
What this historical background shows is the shared history that Anderson argues helps 
defined the imagined community of the nation-state (Anderson, 1983). The early kings and tribal 
origins established France as a separate entity to other peoples and countries. The revolutions 
created a political identity and a national origin story for future generations to rally around. 
Solidarity and the post-war reconstruction united the country together and established key systems 
that have become part of the French identity. The European Union has served to bolster French 
pride as the leaders of the continent while also creating internal resistance to the perceived loss of 
sovereignty an identity. This is similar to the phenomena discussed earlier in Jihad vs. McWorld. 
Both of these reactions to the EU contribute to the French National Identity and how members of 
the nation view themselves and those who are part of the “other.” With a firm grasp of the shared 
history and how it has contributed to the French national identity, the next sections will break down 
other components of national identity beginning first with religion and its role in French society. 
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4.2 Religion and Secularism in France  
 
 
France has a complicated history with religion. It has at times been a bastion of Catholicism 
and fervent defenders of the Church. Other times it has been intensely anti-religious and at times 
actively promoted secular policies. Today it seems to have settled on a sort of compromise between 
the two in a policy known as “Laïcité.” This section will explore the mercurial attitudes towards 
religion in France as well as the impact that current government policies have on the perception of 
outsiders, specifically Muslim refugees.    
As previously discussed, France first became a Christian nation when Clovis I was baptized 
as King of the Franks. France’s monarchs from then on tried to appease the institutions of the 
catholic church and maintain it as a key part of French society.  King Henri IV famously converted 
to Catholicism from Protestantism in order to appease the Catholic majority of the country (Horne, 
2004). The staunchly catholic King Louis XIV famously revoked the Edict of Nantes that provided 
religious freedom to Protestants effectively reasserting Catholicism as part of the French identity 
(Horne, 2004). Throughout the decades Catholicism has remained an important part of French life. 
Even today the majority of French people identify themselves as catholic emphasizing again how 
important this label is to the French identity (Fernando, 2014). While currently 60% of French 
citizens identify as catholic that figure requires a bit of context (Fernando, 2014). 
France is a famously secular country. It maintains a strict separation of church and state 
through a policy of laicity. This policy, in France, known as “Laïcité,” has very broad and strict 
guidelines. It forbids any person who works for the government or serves in a state-funded position 
from displaying any religious iconography or expressing any form of religious beliefs (Fernando, 
2014). This includes state workers, teachers, local officials, doctors and other medical staff, etc. 
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(Fernando, 2014). This has far reaching implications and has also become a central issue within 
the debate surrounding immigration and refugees.  
In the last presidential election, immigration and the Syrian Refugee crisis was at major 
topic of discussion for the candidates. Concerns about the economic impact of migrants and a 
series of terrorist attacks in France had the population feeling anxious. This issue of migration 
quickly got tied to the policy of Laïcité. The growing Muslim population in France posed a new 
challenge to the policy. Many practicing Muslim women continued to wear hijab or “the veil” as 
it is more commonly referred to in France (Bowen, 2007). To some critics this represented an 
unwillingness to assimilate and follow the laws that had been in place for decades (Bowen, 2007). 
To some more extreme pundits, the veil was a symbol of the type of religious extremism that was 
becoming a threat to French citizens (Bowen, 2007). Even though the vast majority of French 
people lived secular lives and rarely participated in any form of religious activities, the Catholic 
heritage of the French nation-state put the white French citizens in the “in” group and forced the 
growing Muslim minority into the “out” group (Bowen, 2007). These Islamophobic sentiments are 
not a new phenomenon in France. During its colonial rule of Algeria, the French government 
attempted to “westernize” and “assimilate” the Muslim populace (Evans, 2012). Many of the 
Algerians who migrated to France have faced generation of discrimination and social exclusion 
(Fernando, 2014). France’s history of exclusion and complicated relationships with minority 
groups will be further expanded upon in a later section of this chapter. 
Religion, like a shared history, is a key component to the imagined community that forms 
a nation and often a major art in the imagined ideology that nationalists rally behind. France is no 
exception. Rassemblement National and other right-wing groups have appealed to religious ideals 
and the “otherness” of different religions to gather supporters who believe in the “true French 
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identity” (Stockemer, 2017). While Marin le Pen advocates for strict enforcement of Laïcité in the 
name of secularism, in reality it has become a tool of discrimination and exclusion for new ethnic 
groups arriving in France. Her policies focus almost exclusively on displays of Muslim religious 
symbols and talk very little about reinforcing policies against the wearing of the cross or display 
of Christian symbols (Rassemblement National, 2016). Yesterday it was the Algerians and today 
it is the Syrians who bear the brunt of this discrimination. Fear and otherness based in religious 




The next element of French national identity that is crucial to the discussion of nationalism 
is language. Anderson points out that language is one of the easiest ways for members of a nation 
to distinguish between members of the “in” group and those outside of the nation (Anderson, 
1983). This section will look at how France and the French language are viewed by French people 
and how these ideas have been weaponized by RN and similar nationalist groups.  
 The official language of France is, unsurprisingly, French. This means that all government 
offices, street signs, and official forms appear in French. The origins of this type of policy can be 
traced back to 1635 and the foundation of the “Académie Française” (Horne, 2004). This institute 
was founded by Cardinal Richelieu for the preservation and study of the French language and to 
this day remains the preeminent authority on the language (Horne, 2004). The entire French 
lexicon as well all the rules of grammar are created and maintained by the Academy (Horne, 2004). 
This has made the ability to speak French, and more importantly “proper” French, a vital 
component for membership in the French nation-state. It also creates the expectation that any 
person who interacts with the massive French bureaucracy should be able to effectively speak 
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French. This makes obtaining legal documents and filling out government forms more difficult for 
those who cannot speak French.  
 The emphasis on speaking French has been weaponized in RN propaganda as well. Those 
who cannot speak French or who speak other languages have been painted as foreigners even if 
they have lived in France for several generations. To many nationalists, the French language is a 
key marker of those in the French-nation state and also serves as a proxy for race and ethnicity. 
French dialects spoken in former colonies in Africa and Southeast Asia are treated as inferior 
versions and those who speak it are marginalized (Evans, 2012). As with history and religion, 
language has been used by modern nationalist movements as another justification and reason to 
view Syrian refugees and most foreigners living in France as a threat and a problem. Le Pen herself 
has declared that her primary goal is to “make France more French” (Nossiter, 2017).  This also 
alludes to larger trends of discrimination that have existed throughout French history. The next 
section will analyze historic incidents of discrimination and exclusion and how that has contributed 
to French national identity and modern nationalist movements. 
4.4 Xenophobia, Islamophobia, and Anti-Semitism in France 
 
 
This section takes a historical and sociological look at various times in history where increased 
levels of discrimination, whether it is anti-Semitism, xenophobia, or islamophobia, have become 
widespread throughout the French nation-state. The first example to be discussed is the anti-
Semitism and discrimination witnessed during World War II. This conflict saw some of the 
greatest humanitarian and human rights tragedies in history. France, a major world power when 
the conflict began, quickly fell to the advancing German forces in 1940. The country was 
subsequently divided into an occupied zone controlled directly by the Nazis and a “free” zone 
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ruled by a cooperative French regime out of Vichy, France. Far from being complacent in German 
rule, the Vichy government actively coordinated efforts with Germany and the SS to capture and 
deport French Jews (Paxton, 2019). The Vichy government was headed by Marshal Petain hero of 
the First World War. Like many of the fascist leaders across Europe at the time. Petain attempted 
to construct a cult of personality that revolved around “true French ideals” and a France for the 
French mentality (Paxton, 2019). The Vichy government produced hundreds of pieces of anti-
Jewish, anti-communist, and anti-immigrant propaganda. These publications created a climate of 
distrust and hostility towards minority groups in both the occupied and free zones.  
This hostility is something that the French government and people are still attempting to 
reconcile. While some have openly apologized and voiced regret for France’s role in the Holocaust, 
the ideologies of French nationalism and anti-Semitism remain prevalent in many regions 
(Calamur, 2019). This state-sponsored hate speech and violence is not something that has been 
forgotten in the decades since. The liberation of France saw the fall of the Vichy regime but not 
the destruction of their ideology. Many political parties emerged that espoused some sort of hateful 
and exclusionary policies. In 1972 many of these fledgling factions were united under the banner 
of the Front National (National Front 2019). This self-proclaimed nationalist party reinvigorated 
the politics of exclusion that had been commonplace during the Vichy regime. France for the 
French, and government that serves white native-born French people became central features of 
the new party. Even beyond formal political organization, many in the French electorate personally 
hold the same beliefs that were codified and formalized during the German occupation of France 
(Wike, 2017). These xenophobic ideas continue to inform the voting patterns of the French 
populace and continue to play a role in the Syrian refugee crisis with many of the former Vichy 
regions of France now being where FN/RN find their highest levels of support (Smith, 2014). 
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Many of the statements and speeches given by Le Pen reflect the same bigoted rhetoric that 
appeared in Vichy French propaganda. During campaign rallies, Le Pen has referred to refugees 
and migrants as “that immense army of the shadows that want us to live in terror” (Nossiter, 2017). 
Campaign posters also emphasize the concept of the “true French people” vs. dangerous 
foreigners. One poster from the last election published by FN depicted a white woman with French 
flags painted on her cheeks with the tagline “Preserve our identity. Vote Front!” Another similar 
poster depicts the same woman juxtaposing a woman in a niqab with the text “Choose your 
neighborhood. Vote Front!” What this quote and these posters show is Le Pen’s clear creation of 
an “us vs. them” dichotomy. There is a clear divide between the beautiful, white, Christian French 
identity, and the shadowy dangerous Muslim foreigners. This conception of the nation creates a 
rallying point for nationalist supporters and promotes Islamophobic policies and discourse.  
 Another startling trend has played a much larger role in the growth of nationalism in 
France. French society has an unfortunate history of segregation and ethnic exclusion. The most 
apparent manifestation of this is the division between cities and the suburbs called “banlieue” 
(Franklin, 2018). While the cities are mostly populated with white French people, the suburbs are 
lower income areas with higher crime rates that have become the home to much of France’s 
minority populations (Franklin, 2018). So stark is this division that many neighborhoods are 
referred to solely as “the north African neighborhood” or “the Muslim quarter” (Franklin, 2018). 
This physical division between the white and minority populations of France carries over into 
social and economic life as well. Schools in these neighborhoods are of lower quality that schools 
in the cities (Franklin, 2018). Economic opportunity is much lower and employers outside of the 
suburbs often will not hire from these demographics, claiming that they employ “true French” 
workers only (Stockemer, 2017). This has caused tension on both sides of the dividing line and 
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continues to be a problem today. People who are descendants of Algerian immigrants are still 
refereed to solely as Algerian even if their family members have been French citizens for multiple 
generations (Stockemer, 2017). This highlights an unwillingness to assimilate and incorporate 
other ethnic groups into French society as a whole. Even today, Algerians and symbols of Algeria 
are used in the campaign messages of FN as representations of “the other.” In the last presidential 
election Front National released posters with an image of the Algerian flag on a ballot going into 
a ballot box. The tagline was “if you do not vote, the immigrants will. Vote Front!” Other similar 
posters displayed a map of France with the Algerian flag superimposed over it and a woman in a 
burka standing beside the map. The poster displayed the message “No to Islamization. Youth for 
the Front.” It is propaganda like this published by Front National that helps perpetuate 
unwillingness to accept refugees and immigrants. This trend of non-assimilation has only become 
more apparent through the early treatment of Syrian refugees entering France. Tent cities appeared 
in many regions of Europe and large refugee camps emerged in Calais (Koroutchev, 2016). The 
unwillingness of French society to accept and integrate new ethnic groups leads to tensions and 
has continually contributed to discriminatory movements throughout French history.  
4.5 Role of the European Union in Nationalist Rhetoric 
 
 
France exists as a member state of the European Union and this membership also plays an 
important role in developing the nationalist French identity that Marine Le Pen and RN have used 
to increase their support. As the leader of the Eurosceptic movement in France, Le Pen has 
continually spoken of the European Union as a threat to the sovereignty of France (Stockemer, 
2017). She has also criticized the Schengen Agreement because of its borderless immigration 
policies that she has argued are responsible for letting in Islamic radicals and other “undesirables” 
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(Stockemer, 2017). The European Union represents the faceless elites that Le Pen has repeatedly 
blamed for much of the struggles of the people. Many of her policies outlined in her “144 
Presidential Proposals” discuss the burden the EU regulations and policies place on French people 
and the threat that its liberal immigration system poses to national security (Rassemblement 
National, 2016). It has also served as a group that can serve as a contrast to “the nation” of true 
French people that French nationalists have created. Continued membership in the EU is criticized 
not only as a bureaucratic drain or a globalist project, but also as an existential threat to France 
(Stockemer, 2017). The rhetoric she uses against the EU not only garners her the support of those 
Eurosceptics that exist in the French populace, but also allow her another opportunity to present 




This chapter explored the origins of French national identity and how the various 
components of this identity have played a part in the rise of nationalism in the 21st century. The 
first section looked at the historical development of the French national identity over time and how 
these various parts have been manipulated by nationalists for their own goals. The subsequent 
sections explored the role that religion and language have played in both the development of a 
unique national identity and the formation of nationalist ideology. The last section provided 
historical examples of when this French identity manifested as an exclusionary label that had 
serious repercussions for those viewed as outside of the nation-state. To solidify her own political 
power, Marine Le Pen has taken presented herself as the protector of the French identity and during 
her failed presidential campaign advertised herself as “the president of those French who want to 
continue living in France as the French do” (Nossiter, 2017). These examples and historical trends 
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have provided the context and explanation for the nationalist reaction in France today due to the 
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5.0 The French Economic Dimension 
 
 
 In contrast with the previous section, which relied primarily on qualitative data and theory, 
this chapter will integrate quantitative data and measurements into the analysis. This will create an 
accurate portrait of the economic realities within the two case studies which can then be used to 
compare and contrast nationalist rhetoric about the economy and the true state of economic affairs. 
Fears of unemployment or overburdening of social safety nets has always been a focus of 
nationalist movements. These strike at the basest of human fears of insecurity and instability. This 
chapter will analyze the effectiveness of this propaganda and look at the language used in the 
discourse about refugees in the national economy. There are several key metrics that are necessary 
to make this kind of analysis so first they must be defined. 
5.1 GDP, GNI, and Unemployment Rate 
 
 
It is important to understand the strength of the French economy because the claims made 
by RN mostly revolves around the idea that international migration has done significant damage 
to the French economy and is responsible for economic woes on both the micro and macro level 
(Alduy, 2016). To measure the strength of an economy three commonly used metric are Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Income (GNI), and the National Unemployment Rate. 
GDP is a valuation of the total output of a national economy based on data from within the physical 
country (France OECD, 2019). In order to get a snapshot of economic health at a particular moment 
and how it changes over time GDP, GDP per capita, and percent change of GDP year to year will 
be used for analysis. GNI is similar to GDP in that it measures total output of a national economy 
but it differs in that it also measures the output of assets held by national companies outside of the 
physical country (France OECD, 2019). The national unemployment rate measures the percentage 
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of the working age population that is currently not working. There are other metrics that could be 
used to measure economic strength such as inflation rate, debt-to-GDP ratio, and change over time 
in the valuation of currency but the these would largely relay the same information as the 
previously chosen metrics without adding much more depth to the analysis. 
5.2 The Employment Rhetoric of French Nationalists 
 
 
Before discussing the economic realities in France, it is important that the motivations and 
rhetoric of the nationalist movement are dissected. Nationalism relies heavily on the fear of the 
“other” and that most clearly manifests when people have fears about immigrants and refugees 
taking away the unskilled labor jobs that many rely on for a living. In order to bolster support for 
their movement, nationalist leaders tap into this fear often distorting the truth in order to paint a 
much scarier world. Trends in international migration and globalization have had profound impact 
on the global economic system but the weaponization of workers fears rarely addressed actual 
concerns or reflect the economic reality of the day. 
Throughout history there are countless examples where the threat of economic uncertainty 
has been central to the ideologies of movements based in fear and hate. In Nazi Germany, the post-
World War I economic downturn was blamed on Jews, communists, and other “undesirables” 
(Paxton, 2019). After the Great Recession, anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States increased 
in response to rising unemployment and concerns about the future of unskilled labor in America 
(Thompson, 2018). Today, concerns about the free movement of labor throughout the Schengen 
Zone has sparked nationalist backlash in Great Britain, France, and Germany. On a basic level 
these fears all revolve around members of the imagined “in” group fearing economic insecurity as 
a result of cheaper immigrant labor replacing their positions.  
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The nationalist movement emerging in France today is no different. Much of the political 
propaganda published during the last presidential and parliamentary elections by Rassemblement 
National (RN) focused on economic issues. In her presidential platform Marine le Pen proposed 
policies that would curb the flow of migrant workers from within the EU, restructure government 
procedures for obtaining work permits, and decrying the economic injustices created by 
globalization and membership in the EU (Rassemblement National, 2016). While many of the 
published policies seem to target EU migrants and migration in general, much of the contemporary 
rhetoric has revolved around Syrian refugees as the number of Syrians in Europe increases 
(Stockemer, 2017). On the campaign trail, Marine Le Pen denounced France’s acceptance of 
Syrian refugees stating “more and more are coming from the third world taking advantage of our 
benefits” (Nossiter, 2017). The reason for this focus on foreign migrants is largely motivated by 
racism and islamophobia. The anti-migrant laborer propaganda focuses on two groups: Eastern 
European migrants, who are not viewed on the same level as citizens of Western European 
countries, and Syrian migrants who are viewed as foreigners and threats to national and economic 
security (Calamur, 2019).  
5.3 Migrants as a Threat to Social Safety Nets 
 
 
In addition to fears over unemployment and the loss of jobs, nationalist propaganda also 
often portrays migrants and foreigners as burdens on the state. France is renowned for the scope 
and pervasiveness of its social programs but membership in the European Union and global 
migration patterns are now causing some to call for reforms to the system. In order to fully 
comprehend the proposed reforms and the propaganda concerning the welfare state this section 
will first provide a brief overview of the French welfare system.  
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In comparison to many of its fellow Western European states, France has a much more 
comprehensive approach to social welfare. Annually, it allocates 31% of its GDP towards its 
various social programs (Thomas, 2019). Funding for this program is derived from taxes collected 
on individuals and businesses. France collects 46.2% of its governmental operating budget from 
personal income taxes (Dobush, 2018). It uses this money to fund a wide variety of social 
programs. The most well-known of these programs is France’s socialized medical insurance 
scheme. This program covers all medical expenses as well as the cost of prescription drugs. One 
unintended consequence of this is that the average French citizen consumes far more 
pharmaceuticals than other EU members. A reported 90% of doctors’ appointments end with 
someone receiving a prescription for medication (Local, 2019). The current system does not 
require individuals to provide any form of proof that they are a French or EU citizen and any 
person can use the medical services. This singular point became a major point of contention in the 
last election. This insurance program also covers other forms of medical care including dental 
medicine, optometry, and other specialty care. While most primary care medical expenses are fully 
covered through government programs, some specialty care requires individuals to pay a small 
portion of costs (Local, 2019). The total costs of medical procedures per capita is still much lower 
than in other developed nations, notably the United States. In addition to health insurance, the 
French welfare state also provides other forms of support through unemployment insurance, 
workplace injury insurance, paid family leave, and retirement (Dobush, 2019).  
As the average age of French and European Union citizens continues to increase there soon 
will be a larger pool of people pulling from state services than those paying into the system. This 
is a genuine concern and is a problem that much of the developed world is going to have to face 
as the reproductive rate of the developed world continues to decline. In order to address these 
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concerns reforms are necessary but those put forward by Marine Le Pen and RN attempt to use 
foreign nationals as a scapegoat for the cracks emerging in the system. In her presidential platform 
Marine Le Pen put forward several policy proposals designed at limiting access to health care for 
non-French citizens. One program would create a system of national medical identification cards 
that would be required in order to receive care (Rassemblement National, 2016). These cards 
would only be provided for French citizens and would force EU migrants and Syrian Refugees to 
pay for medical treatment out of pocket, utilize some form of private insurance, or receive care 
from non-governmental organizations (NGO) like the International Red Cross or World Health 
Organization (WHO). The logic put forward is that these people are not paying into this system or 
contributing to the French economy so they should not be able to benefit from it. Le Pen has bluntly 
stated what she believes to be the motivation for Syrian refugees coming to France as follows: 
“They want to transform France into a giant squat house” (Nossiter, 2017). This rhetoric, 
portraying foreigners as parasites on the system, creates another dangerous “us vs. them” division 
about healthcare and causes people to falsely assign blame to immigrants when the real problem 
is the aging of the French populace.  
5.4 Economic Realities in France 
 
 
Now that the propaganda and rhetoric of French Nationalists is understood, this can be 
contrasted with the economic realities in France. This section will utilize the previously defined 
metrics in order to develop an understanding of the strength and general trend of the French 
economy. As was alluded to in the previous section, there are genuine criticisms of the French 
economy that can be made but the solutions and policies put forward by RN unfairly target EU 
migrants and Syrian refugees as scapegoats. The facts and figures surrounding the French economy 
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will show that these groups have contributed little to the economic struggles that motivate many 
French voters and that these groups can in fact help long term economic growth. 
GDP and GNI are essential metrics of economic growth and health. To contrast the 
propaganda discussed above, this section will provide facts and figures that ultimately dispel the 
protectionist rhetoric of RN. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), France is classified as a “High Income” member state meaning that its 
level of prosperity and economic health are some of the highest in the world today (France OECD, 
2019). Since the Global Economic Crisis and Recession of 2008 swept across Western Europe, 
France has experienced an average annual GDP growth of 1.40% compared to the United States 
which average around 2% growth annually (France OECD, 2019). This is a healthy level of growth 
for a country of France’s size and makes it one of the more robust members of the Single Market 
in the European Union (The European Union, 2020). The Central Intelligence Agency World 
Factbook also reports that Frances GDP per capita in 2019 is $42, 953.27 making it the 41st highest 
in the world (CIA, 2019). The World Bank reported in 2018 that France’s GNI per capita was $43, 
600, closely mirroring its GDP per capita (World Bank France, 2020). What all these metrics 
indicate is that France continues to have a healthy economy that has remained largely unaffected 
by the influx of Syrian refugees beginning in 2012. 
With regards to unemployment it is important to note that the unemployment rate in France 
did rise between the February 2008 reaching a peak of 10.6% in May 2015 (World Bank France, 
2020). Upon first glance it could be easy to falsely relate this to the increase in refugees entering 
the European Union and France. The Syrian refugee crisis is generally agreed to have begun in 
2012 and numbers of refugees began to decline after a peak in 2015 due to new restrictions, 
regulation, and changing situations in the Middle East and European Union (BBC, 2016). A quick 
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exploration of other factors reveals that this correlation is likely unrelated to the increase in 
unemployment. Many economists note that this trend can more accurately be attributed to 
continued fallout from the Global Economic Recession in 2008. The impact of this event caused 
the slowdown of economic activity in much of the developed world and hit those economies closest 
to the United States the hardest. This includes the European Union, China, Japan, and many other 
prominent trading partners. Another point related to this trend that also further separates 
unemployment from the increase in migration is the fact that this increase in unemployment during 
this same time frame can be seen in many other countries. This includes other EU member states 
as well as countries completely removed from Europe and the Syrian refugee crisis. In Europe, the 
United Kingdom also experienced a similar rise in unemployment during the same time frame. 
Another EU member, Lithuania, experienced a much more dramatic spike in unemployment 
during this time reaching a peak of 18.3% in July 2010 (World Bank Lithuania, 2020). This 
example is of particular importance because Lithuania has received very few refugees under the 
EU’s resettlement program. This suggests that the rise in unemployment witnessed in Lithuania, 
and many other EU member states, is caused by a factor other than an influx of Syrians. There are 
two factors, operating on different scales, that are responsible for these increases in unemployment. 
On the international level, continued fallout from the Eurozone crisis has contributed to 
restructuring and increased unemployment (Smith, 2014). On the local level, automation has 
decreased the required number of people to effectively operate most manufacturing plants (Smith, 
2014). Neither of these factors has anything to do with immigration and neither is the focus of 
nationalist rhetoric.  
 The regions of France where the RN has gained the most ground and finds the most support 
are the northern industrial districts. In these regions, large portions of the population rely on 
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manufacturing jobs as their primary source of income. As technology has continued to improve, 
the need for large human workforces has steadily declined. Factory owners and corporations have 
found that investment in automation and robotic processes can help maximize profits and 
efficiency. Of course, these come at the cost of many human jobs. This is not a uniquely French 
problem, across the developed world, automation is displacing thousands of workers who had 
previously stable employment. Unfortunately, for the governments of the world, retraining and re-
educating workers are currently the best options for addressing this economic trend. Programs like 
these are expensive, take time, and do not provide guaranteed employment for workers who 
complete them. This is why so many workers are drawn to the populist rhetoric of those preaching 
economic nationalism like Marine Le Pen in France or Donald Trump in the United States. An 
interesting facet of this trend is that researchers have found that it is not the bottom of the working 
class impacting by automation that tends to vote more for the radical right, but rather it is the lower 
middle class where FN finds the most support (Im, 2019). In a paper published by Zhen Jie Im et 
al. they argued that lower middle-class workers, who are under threat from automation, tend to 
vote more for the radical right than their working-class peers (Im, 2019) This is because working 
class voters are typically politically inactive and tend to abstain from elections more than voting 
for the far right. The lower middle class, that have both the economic fears imposed and the 
political consciousness to participate in elections, are the base of FN/RN in the modern era (Im, 
2019). The rhetoric put forward by RN gives a face to the challenges and threat endured by French 
workers and this lower middle class. Policies like limiting migration or increasing documentation 
requirement for foreign workers are offered as quick solutions to complex problems. RN voters 
support these policies, regardless of the lack of evidence supporting them, because doing anything 
is better than the current inaction they witness from the national government.  
   54 
Concerns about unemployment and economic fears are one of the most powerful 
motivators for any voter. Rassemblement National’s effective weaponization of these fears can 
best be understood by analyzing where it has had the most impact. In the 2014 European 
Parliament elections, Front National found the most success in regions with the highest 
unemployment rates and regions where unemployment had increased the most since the last 
election (Smith, 2014). Maps depicting regions with higher unemployment and higher support for 
FN show a remarkable level of overlap. These regions also have the same catholic populations 
without college educations that were shown to have a more favorable view of FN in the previous 
chapter (Wike, 2017). This means that these regions are more likely to buy in to the xenophobic 
propaganda of FN and are more likely to feel the supposed “consequences” of unregulated 
immigration as Le Pen presents it. Yet, there is consistent evidence that suggests that not only does 
immigration not hurt employment rates or overburden social programs but in fact may actually 
help promote long term economic success over time. 
5.5 Immigration Rates and Aging Populations 
 
 
This section will explore the relationship between immigration, aging workforces, and 
long-term economic health. In their article “Should International Migration Be Encouraged to 
Offset Population Aging? A Cross-Country Analysis of Public Attitudes in Europe” published in 
the Population Research and Policy Review authors Ceobanu and Koropeckyj-Cox analyze the 
relationship between migration and long-term economic growth. Their argument is based on the 
current demographic trends that can be observed not only in Europe, but in most of the developing 
world: the average age of a person in the developed world is increasing. This has troubling 
implications for the economic welfare of these countries moving forward. Countries like Japan 
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and China are projected to experience a reduction in the size of their workforce by almost 20% by 
2040 (Ceobanu, 2013). By 2060, if current trends continue, Japan will lose almost half of its 
working age population (Ceobanu, 2013). Countries like France, Italy, and German are also 
projected to experience similar reductions of 10-15% over a similar timeframe (Ceobanu, 2013). 
What they discuss in this piece is the very mechanism behind what’s motivating many nationalist 
supporters. Automation and aging populations are the actual causes of increasing unemployment 
and the increased burden on social services. While nationalist parties have been quick to blame 
immigration, this paper and the paper of Ceobanu highlight that immigration may actually be the 
key to saving Western workforces and their national economies. 
 The theory proposed by Ceobanu and Koropeckyj-Cox argues that the economic benefits 
conferred on a state by international migration greatly outweigh any nationalistic or xenophobic 
concerns about their impact on the nation. They point to that immigrant populations tend to be 
younger, tend to have children at a higher rate than native citizens (at least for the first few 
generations), and that they have a high tendency to open small businesses that increase local 
employment and governmental tax revenues (Ceobanu, 2013). The income tax and other forms of 
government revenue collecting implemented in the European Union, such as the Value Added Tax 
(VAT) on most goods, are the means by which current and future immigrants can help contribute 
to long term economic health in the EU. For France and Turkey, the two case studies of this thesis, 
immigration and the acceptance of Syrian refugees could help remedy the problems that will arise 
as French and Turkish populations continue to age with a low reproductive rate.  
 Scholars also point out that countries with robust immigration policies have thus far been 
able to avoid the early stages of this global aging and decline in workforce. Particularly, Australia, 
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom are highlighted as examples where their higher 
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levels of immigration have managed to keep the average age of the work force low and these 
countries are some of the few developed nations expected to experience an increase in their 
working age populations over the next several decades (Ceobanu, 2013). This literature has not 
been updated to factor in the changes to British immigration as a result of Brexit, but they 
nonetheless provide valuable insight into the positive impacts of immigration. The take-away is 
clear that Syrian refugees, and indeed most immigrants may actually help the economy rather than 
hurt it as nationalists are quick to argue.  
5.6 Synthesis  
 
 
This section explored the myths and rhetoric surrounding immigration and economics put 
forward by the Nationalist movement of France, manifesting in the Rassemblement National. This 
propaganda was then contrasted with the economic realities of the state expressed by its 
unemployment rate, GDP, and GNI revealing that many of the claims made by RN are completely 
false or based in misinformation and fearmongering. The last section then revealed that not only 
are immigrants not responsible for increasing unemployment rates and overburdening of social 
safety nets, but may in fact be the key to fighting these problems and promoting long term 
economic health in France. Economic fears are a central tenet of many nationalist platforms, but 
it is not one that is based in reality. It serves only as a method of promoting simple populist 
solutions based in xenophobia that, in the long term, may end up hurting the people that they are 
supposed to help the most.  
 What these three chapters have shown is how Marine Le Pen has rebranded Front National 
for the modern world in order to expand the reach of party’s message. She has worked to take 
advantage of pre-existing biases amongst certain populations of the French electorate in order to 
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create an exclusionary definition of what it means to be French. This creates an imagined concept 
of the French nation that serves as an “in group” that must be protected from the “out group.” To 
fill the role of this nefarious out group, RN has casted Syrian refugees as economic burdens who 
want to come take jobs and pensions away from French workers and corrupt the purity of France 
through Islamization. The in-group out-group dynamic used by Le Pen and her party have not yet 
won her the presidency, but they have begun to win some municipal positions and European 
Parliament seats for the French nationalist movement. This malevolent messaging and political 
strategy have added xenophobia and islamophobia back into mainstream French politics to the 
detriment of the state, European Union, and world as a whole. 
 The next three chapters will examine how Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and 
Development Party have relied on developing a similar in-group out-group dynamic to solidify 
their power and accomplish their political agenda. Turkey provides a case study in what happens 
once nationalist discourse becomes translated into nationalist policy, and highlights the human 
cost of these ideologies for citizens and refugees alike.   
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6.0 Turkish Leadership 
 
 
Now that the discussion of France and the variety of factors contributing to its revival of 
nationalism is concluded, the next three chapters will focus on the other case study: Turkey. To 
allow for an easy comparison of the two case studies, a parallel structure will be used. This means 
that the same dimensions and factors, such as religion and economics, will be discussed but within 
the framework of Turkish society and historical background. Since the first factor discussed for 
the French case was the role that leadership and the prevailing nationalist party play on modern 
nationalism, this will also be the focus of this first chapter for Turkey. Just as Marine Le Pen and 
the nationalist party her father founded have largely shaped the narrative of French nationalism in 
the 21st century, so too have Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) shaped the 
policy regarding Syrian refugees.  
One key difference between the role of Erdogan and Le Pen is that Erdogan is currently 
the president of the Republic of Turkey and his party controls the legislature. This makes 
Erdogan’s leadership more impactful because while Le Pen and RN have added their ideology to 
the national political discourse, Erdogan and his party currently make up the ruling regime in 
Turkey. Their influence goes beyond simple proposals and campaign platforms and is actually 
translated into real policy decisions. This section will highlight Erdogan’s rise to power and the 
influence that he has had on shaping the nationalist discourse surrounding the millions of Syrian 
Refugees who live in Turkey today. To begin this discussion, the next section will provide a brief 
biography of President Erdogan and his rise to power in Turkey.  
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6.1 Biography of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
 
 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was born in Istanbul, Turkey on February 26, 1954 and completed 
his primary schooling in the Istanbul school system (Republic of Turkey, 2020). He received his 
college degree from Marmara University’s Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences in 
1981 and during his time in college took an active role in youth politics as a member of several 
political youth organizations (Republic of Turkey, 2020). His first foray into formal politics came 
in 1983 when he joined the newly founded Welfare Party, an Islamist political group that replaced 
two previously existing Islamic parties that had been banned from political participation (Republic 
of Turkey, 2020). Eventually in 1998, the Welfare party itself would also be banned from the 
political arena because it, like its predecessors, was determined to have violated the constitutional 
separation of church and state (Taspinar, 2012). Quickly rising through the ranks of the party, 
Erdogan became a member of the party’s Central Executive Board in 1985, where he used his new 
position to increase youth and women outreach to broaden the party’s base (Republic of Turkey, 
2020). On March 27, 1994, four years before the party would be banned by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court, Erdogan was elected Mayor of Metropolitan Istanbul and began a series of 
reforms and projects aimed at improving life for Turkish citizens in a bid to garner more support 
for his Islamist party (Republic of Turkey, 2020).  
As the central government, army, and Constitutional court began to grow increasingly wary 
of the messaging and theocratic nature of the Welfare Party, Erdogan became an outspoken 
proponent of his party and its religious ideologies (Taspinar, 2012). This culminated in public 
speech where he recited a modified version of a historical Turkish poem, where the modified verses 
were deemed by the Turkish court system to be a call to arms of the Welfare Party’s Islamic 
supporters and an attempt to incite violence against the state (Taspinar ,2012). As a result of this 
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incident Erdogan was convicted of attempting to incite violence of a religious or racial nature, 
stripped of his mayoral title, and sentenced to ten months in prison (Republic of Turkey, 2020).  
After serving four months of his ten-month sentence, Erdogan and other former members 
of various Islamic political factions founded the Justice and Development Party in 2001, which 
goes by the Turkish abbreviation AKP (Republic of Turkey, 2020). This party like the Welfare 
party found its roots in Islamic ideologies and struggled to present itself in a way that would not 
result in its forced removal or ban by the constitutional court (Taspinar, 2012). This new party 
quickly gained popularity and Erdogan was elected to the office of prime minster in the 2003 
elections running on a center-right Islamist platform (Republic of Turkey, 2020). He would serve 
as Prime Minister of Turkey under the now-defunct parliamentary system from 2003 to 2014, and 
in 2014 was elected to be the 12th President of the Republic of Turkey (Republic of Turkey, 2020).  
In 2017, the Turkish parliament passed a constitutional amendment changing Turkey from 
a semi-presidential system where the majority of the power rested with the parliament to a full 
presidential system (Republic of Turkey, 2020). In 2018, Erdogan was elected as the “First 
President of the Republic of Turkey” under the new system and carried his party to a majority of 
seats in the legislature (Republic of Turkey, 2020). The major impact of this political change was 
that it granted much broader powers to the executive and allowed Erdogan to speed up the 
democratic backslide that has been ongoing in Turkey for many years (Eder, 2016). What is clear 
from this brief biography is the Islamic basis for much of Erdogan’s political career and his ability 
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6.2 The Rise of the Justice and Development Party 
 
 
Unlike FN/RN in France which has existed for almost 50 years, Erdogan’s AKP has only 
been around for 19 years (Kumbaracibasi, 2009). It is important to note however that AKP is very 
much the successor of previous Islamist parties who have existed at the margins of Turkish politics 
since the mid to late 20th century (Taspinar, 2012). The key to AKP’s success seems to be a 
combination of rebranding and shifts in the political structure of Turkey. While previous Islamic-
based parties like the Welfare Party and its predecessor were removed either by the military or by 
the Constitutional Court, Erdogan has managed to avoid these two major hurtles as he centralizes 
power under the office of the president (Eder, 2016). One reason for this is his co-optation and 
appeasement of the military in Turkey which has allowed him to not only avoid political 
banishment but also more directly enforce his will onto the people (Kumbaracibasi, 2009). To 
overcome the second major hurtle, Erdogan has taken a two pronged approached of appointing 
loyal justices to the Constitutional court, as well as marketing the AKP as center-right conservative 
party rather than an more radical Islamic party like the Welfare Party and others (Taspinar, 2012). 
This has allowed his party to not only remain a legitimate political entity, but has also allowed 
AKP to become an unchallenged political force in Turkey with Erdogan serving as its increasingly 
authoritarian leader (Eder, 2016). 
Erdogan’s efforts to rebrand the AKP provides two valuable insights to the overall 
discussion of contemporary nationalism. First, it highlights that Erdogan’s desire to remain in 
power supersedes any ideological convictions he has about promoting Islamic ideals. While he 
still has calls for solidarity with other Islamic parties across the Muslim world, notably the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, he is willing to sacrifice that branding to remain in control of government 
(Kumbaracibasi, 2009). This observation then lends itself to the second major insight which can 
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help explain the disconnect between Erdogan’s message of Islamic solidarity and his 
discrimination and anti-Syrian messaging (Farooq, 2019). In order to achieve this rebranding 
Erdogan and AKP have had to add additional dimensions to their party platform in order to rally 
supporters. What they have chosen to focus on is the Turkish national identity and their imagining 
of the nation-state (Kumbaracibasi, 2009). This is why we see a resurgence of focus on the legacy 
of the Ottomans and Atatürk as well as parallels being drawn to Erdogan and famous historical 
leaders of Turkey (Eder, 2016). The state-run website from which much of the above biographical 
information was drawn makes numerous emphatic references to Erdogan as the “First President of 
the Republic of Turkey” and features portraits of Erdogan and Atatürk side by side (Republic of 
Turkey, 2020). Images from various speeches or rallies that Erdogan has attended also contain his 
portrait usually paired with the Turkish flag and portraits of Ataturk. This is all a thinly veiled 
attempt to create a connection between President Erdogan and the “Father of Modern Turkey” 
Atatürk in order to further establish the cult of personality he has fostered as an authoritarian 
president. The irony is that secular, progressive Ataturk and Islamist, authoritarian Erdogan could 
not be more different leaders. What this reliance on national identity and pride has done is create 
the perfect breeding ground for nationalism in Turkey. So although the vast majority of Syrian 
refugees residing in Turkey belong to the same sect of Islam that Erdogan and his supporters do, 
the difference in national origin now matters more in the interactions between these groups. This 
explains the religious paradox and provides background for the role that Erdogan and AKP have 
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6.3 Electoral Support for AKP 
 
 
As discussed with the French example, it is important to understand who is voting for AKP 
and why. Turkey’s recent national and municipal elections provide insight into the evolving voting 
patterns of the Turkish electorate. Although Erdogan’s AKP maintains control of the country on 
almost every level, some challenges have slowly begun to emerge from the opposition. The most 
notable challenge was AKP’s recent loss in the mayoral election in Istanbul in 2019 to the 
Republican People’s Party (Soz, 2019). This Republican People’s Party, abbreviated as CHP, won 
the rerun of the election in June 2019 after the results of the original March 2019 election were 
contested (Soz, 2019). CHP is a social democratic party that follows in the legacy of Ataturk as a 
more secular, progressive, and cosmopolitan party. Increasing concern about Erdogan’s 
authoritarianism and Islamic principles have caused an increase in support for opposition parties 
in Turkey (Soz, 2019). One of the major issues that concerns Turkish voters is the war in Syria 
and the influx of refugees. On this issue, Erdogan’s party maintains a majority of popular support 
for their policies and initiatives (Soz, 2019). Where they seem to be facing the most opposition is 
on relations with Turkey’s Kurdish population and their economic practices. On these issues, AKP 
has faced its own internal struggles with their “chief strategist” resigning over Erdogan’s 
unwillingness to make reforms, and their chief economic minister resigning due to similar 
concerns (Soz, 2019). This has put Erdogan’s son-in-law, Beret Albayrak, in charge of economic 
advisement. Erdogan’s rhetoric against the Kurds has also caused some Turkish voters to question 
their support for his party. Another opposition party in Turkey is the pro-Kurdish People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP) which has mobilized Kurdish voters in opposition to AKP (Soz, 2019). 
 Unfortunately, two major factors limit the effectiveness of these opposition movements to 
AKP. The first is that Erdogan’s policies on the Syrian War and Syrian refugee crisis still remain 
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hugely popular amongst Turkish voters (Soz, 2019). This allowed him and AKP to win the national 
elections in 2018 and has assured that they will remain in power at least until the next elections in 
2023 (Soz, 2019). The second factor is that the longer Erdogan remains in power, the more 
authoritarian the Turkish government becomes and the less the actual will of the people matters. 
Since the attempted coup against him, Erdogan has begun jailing journalists, government officials, 
and other political figures who oppose his party on vague charges of terrorism (Soz, 2019). He has 
gone so far already as to forcibly remove and arrest several HDP mayors and party leaders on 
charges of terrorism in a clear authoritarian power grab (Soz, 2019). Thus, for the time being it 
appears as if the majority of Turkish voters still support Erdogan and his government and the 
longer they support him the less likely it is that an effective challenge can be mounted to his 
authority. This means that the more time passes, the more powerful Erdogan becomes and the more 
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7.0 Turkish National Identity 
 
 
Continuing with the parallel structure of analysis, this chapter will discuss the origin of the 
Turkish national identity. As Anderson explains in Imagined Communities, national identity and 
the idea of the nation  is based on invisible ties built around a shared language, a common history, 
and other cultural factors such as religion (Anderson, 1983). This chapter will break down each of 
these components in order to develop a deep understanding of what Turkish people believe it 
means to be Turkish and what they think separates them from nations and ethnic groups around 
them. Ultimately, it is these perceived differences that create the exclusionary mentality which 
leads to the nationalist sentiment observed in modern Turkey and the discrimination of Syrian 
refugees. This section recounts the historical and cultural development of the Turkish national 
identity and then shows how it has been weaponized by Turkish nationalists to exclude Syrian 
refugees and promote Erdogan and AKP as the protectors of this unique cultural identity.  
7.1 Origins and History 
 
 
The name Turkey is derived from the ancient Latin word meaning “land of the Turks.” Similar 
to how the Gauls were a semi-nomadic tribe that settled in modern France, the Turks settled within 
the boundaries of modern-day Turkey (Kaldellis, 2019). The rich agriculture land and access to 
ports allowed them to quickly establish prosperous settlements and slowly sow the seeds of future 
empire (Kaldellis, 2019). 
The history of the Turkish people begins with several centuries of conquest and reconquest 
and occupation by a variety of different forces. Most notably the first large empire to occupy parts 
of modern Turkey was the Roman empire (Kaldellis, 2019). As with much of the known ancient 
world, the Turkish people were governed as a province of the Roman empire. As the power of 
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Rome began to decline Constantinople, what is today known as Istanbul, Turkey, was declared the 
capital of the Eastern Roman Empire when the imperial holdings were divided in two in 330 AD 
(Kaldellis, 2019). The Eastern Roman Empire, also known as the Byzantine Empire, would outlast 
much of the western Roman empire with Turkey as its center of power (Kaldellis, 2019). This 
imperial prestige is often harkened back to in Turkish culture and classical literature (Uzer, 2016). 
The siege of Constantinople in 1453 crushed the last remnants of the ancient Roman empire and 
gave rise to the Ottoman Empire, with whom the modern Turkish state relates much more closely 
to (Kia, 2019). The Ottomans empire differed from many other major powers at the time in that it 
did not impose its language or culture on the lands and people they conquered (Kia, 2019). They 
ruled over many nations and many peoples until the end of the First World War, while allowing 
those in the conquered provinces to live their lives largely uninterrupted by the conquering 
authorities (Kia, 2019). This does not mean that the Ottomans viewed all cultural groups equally 
though. They still viewed their centralized Islam-based culture as superior to the Christians and 
other religious sects over which they had dominion, but their religious tolerance was something 
largely unseen at the time (Kia, 2019). 
World War I saw the end of the long-standing Ottoman Empire and the birth of the modern 
Republic of Turkey (Kia, 2019). The founder and “father” of this new republic is Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. As the first president of the new republic elected in 1923 he began several ambitious and 
large-scale projects aimed at modernizing and westernizing the new Turkish state (Bay, 2011). He 
also sought to establish Turkey as a regional power seeking diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union and many western powers including the longtime enemies of the Turks, Greece (Bay, 2011). 
The cultural impact of Atatürk and his programs had far reaching implications for the Turkish state 
and the modern Turkish national identity. The following sections will go into more detail about 
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how each of these historical time periods impacted and contributed to the Turkish identity. A 
particular focus will be given to the impact of Atatürk and his programs, because many Turkish 
people today still view him as the father of the nation (Bay, 2011). The Turkish people take pride 
in their history of empires, conquest, and progressive development. The modernization and 
secularization conducted by Atatürk set Turkey apart from many of its Middle Eastern neighbors. 
This has over time contributed to a sense of superiority that has now become the root of nationalism 
and discrimination in modern Turkey. Syrians and other Arabic refugees are viewed as inferior to 
the Turkish people and unwelcome in their country (Uzer, 2016). These historical events and 
trends have again highlighted that the development of a national identity and the concept of a 
shared history serves as a powerful basis for contemporary nationalism.  
7.2 Turkey in the Islamic World 
 
 
Perhaps one of the most defining features of the Turkish national identity is the constant effort 
by the Turkish people to stand out and exist as a separate entity from the rest of the world around 
them. This holds true both in the ancient world and as they became members of the Islamic world. 
While Kissinger in his book World Order suggests that most Islamic based governments at their 
core seek a unified multinational caliphate, Turkey throughout its history has sought to 
differentiate itself form the powerful Islamic entities (Uzer, 2016). The two predominant ethnic 
groups that make up the majority of the middle east are Persian and Arabic. Persian people 
originate from Iran and speak the language Farsi. This language, spread by the Persian empire, is 
today spoken in a variety of dialects in Afghanistan and Tajikistan as well as modern day Iran 
(Uzer, 2016). Arabic people originate from the Arabian Peninsula and through early Muslim 
conquests now inhabit the majority of the middle east. Arabic is also the name of the language 
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spoken in the majority of these countries although regional dialects and variations exist (Uzer, 
2016). The Turkish people have made a conscious effort to resist assimilation into either of these 
groups even during the many centuries of conquest and occupation that saw these groups trading 
control of Turkey (Uzer, 2016). The Turks also maintained their own unique culture during the 
Byzantine empire and the governance of the Romans. This effort to create and preserve a unique 
identity has existed throughout Turkish history and continue until the modern era. This next section 
will look at religion and the role that it has played in shaping Turkish national identity. 
7.3 Religion and Secularism in Turkey 
 
 
While France converted to Christianity early on in its history, Turkey has had a less straight 
forward trajectory in terms of religion. The Byzantine empire, with its capital in Constantinople, 
emerged during the last years of the Roman empire when Emperor Constantine had declared 
Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire (Kaldellis, 2019). The division of the empire 
also corresponded with a division of Christendom where the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Eastern Orthodox Church split (Kaldellis, 2019). The Orthodox church became an integral part of 
the Byzantine culture and part of the lives of Turkish people residing within imperial borders 
(Kaldellis, 2019). Change in governance brought with it changes in religion as well.  
As the Ottomans built their empire from the ruins of the Byzantine empire, they brought to 
their new government their religion: Islam (Kia, 2019). For the remainder of Turkish history the 
predominant religious group is Muslim. This does not mean that there are no other groups present 
but the vast majority identify with Islam. During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, being Muslim 
became an essential component to the Turkish identity. While the Ottoman empire maintained 
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religious tolerance for a wide variety of ethnicities and religions, Turkish Muslims had the most 
opportunity to advance through the vast Ottoman bureaucracy (Kia, 2019).  
With the birth of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk wanted to reshape the Turkish identity and 
pivot away from the Islamic world and more towards the western world (Bay, 2011). One of the 
major reforms that Ataturk enacted was a strict policy of secularism in the new Republic of Turkey 
(Bay, 2011). This forbid the public display of religious symbols, the wearing of religious dress 
such as head scarves, and banned the call to prayer that was often loudly broadcasted in the streets 
to worshippers (Edroos, 2018). The provisions regarding secularism in the new constitution also 
established a strict separation between religion and governance (Edroos, 2018). These provisions 
are the same ones that were used by Turkey’s constitutional court to ban Erdogan’s previous 
Islamist parties. The rigidity of Turkey’s secular governance is based on some of the regions 
strictest laws regarding religion and government. 
 This has all begun to change under the rule of Erdogan and AKP. The active promotion of 
Islamist ideas and reliance on support from conservative Muslim communities has shaped the 
current governments approach towards secularism. Some representatives within AKP have called 
this constitutional secularism oppressive towards “pious citizens” and have called for reforms to 
assure that religious Turks receive the” same rights” as every other Turkish citizen (Edroos, 2018). 
Some more radical members of AKP have even called for amendments to the constitution to 
remove the state enforced secularism to allow for more Islamic policies in government (Edroos, 
2018). One notable champion of this movement is Erdogan’s wife who regular wears a headscarf 
during public appearances and in government offices. This type of rhetoric, while appealing the 
conservative Muslims in Turkey, has little appeal to the general voting population in Turkey who 
view secularism as an important part of modern Turkish culture (Edroos, 2018). There has been 
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push back from his political opposition as well as resistance from Turks who for generations have 
enjoyed a secular society in Turkey (Heper, 2013). Acknowledging the risk of promoting such 
radical pro-Islamic changes to Turkey’s constitution, Erdogan has taken a much more measured 
approach to the issue promoting relaxation of these laws rather than their outright abolishment 
(Edroos, 2018). While he is still undoubtedly a pro-Islamist leader who promotes Islamic values 
through his policies, Erdogan’s tact in adjusting his rhetoric to increase his appeal shows his skill 
as a populist leader. His recent actions taken against Syrian refugees also highlight his ability to 
go directly against his messages of Muslim solidarity in order to maintain popular support and 
political control.  
The millions of Syrians currently residing within Turkey belong to the same religious sect 
as Erdogan and most Turkish Muslims, yet the forced deportations and anti-immigrant rhetoric 
that is coming from Ankara highlights that national identity supersedes religious unity. Turkey’s 
history has been one of divergence and differentiation in the Muslim world and Erdogan’s current 
policies put this on display. While he has used religion to develop a cult of personality and to rally 
supporters, his focus is on the preservation of the nation over which he rules and not loftier goals 
of religious unity and harmony. While the Ottomans and beyond have been major powers in the 
Islamic world, the Turkish national identity has always been one that emphasizes it uniqueness 
and separation from all countries around it. This is the basis for Turkish nationalism that is 
observed today. Turkey has and continued to view itself as distinct and more advanced than its 
Arabic neighbors and as such has rallied to Erdogan nationalistic and protectionist messaging. The 
current debates surrounding Turkish secularism highlight both the general public’s resistance to 
Islamic elements of society, and Erdogan’s ability to adapt his message to best reflect the what he 
perceives as the general will of the people. While religion plays a key part in this differentiation, 
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language has also played a role in helping Turks set themselves apart from both Europe and the 
Middle East and this dynamic is explored in the next section.  
7.4 Written and Spoken Language 
 
 
As previously discussed the two predominant language groups in the middle east are Farsi and 
Arabic. Yet, in Turkey they speak neither of these languages and instead speak their own unique 
language: Turkish (Uzer, 2016). This is notable because the reason that two languages dominant 
so many countries is primarily because of the history of conquest in the area. First the Persian 
empire conquered and spread Farsi to all its provinces, and then the spread of Arabic tribes and 
the spread of Islam through conquest spread Arabic across the Middle East (Kia, 2019). Yet, the 
Turkish people managed to preserve their language during all the centuries of occupation and 
shifting governments. This has helped the Turkish people maintain their unique national identity.  
Another important contribution that Atatürk and his reforms made to the modern Turkish 
national identity is the change in alphabet. During Ottoman rule, Ottoman Turkish utilized the 
same Perso-Arabic alphabet that was used throughout the Middle East but as part of his 
westernization efforts Atatürk changed this to the Latin alphabet used throughout Western Europe 
(Bay, 2011). This further distinguished Turkish from any other language in the surrounding 
countries. Now, not only did the spoken language distinguish Turks from those around them but 
after this alphabetic shift the written language also provided another differentiating characteristic. 
7.5 Turkey and the European Union 
 
 
Although Turkey has yet to gain membership into the European Union, the regional 
cooperation still plays a role in Turkish politics and the Turkish national identity. The continued 
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attempts by consecutive regimes to gain membership into the EU highlights the Turkish desire for 
formal recognition as a European state. Going back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, Turks 
played an active role in the First World War and sought to be viewed as an equal colonial power 
to the Western empires of continental Europe (Kia, 2019). After the fall of the Ottomans, the 
primary goal of Ataturk’s reform movement was the modernization, secularization, and 
westernization of Turkey so that it would be culturally more similar to continental Europe and 
could further distinguish itself from the Middle East (Bay, 2011). Today, the pursuit of 
membership in the EU is the continuation of this desire to be viewed as an integral part of Europe. 
These efforts have been complicated by Erdogan and his increasingly authoritarian tendencies. 
The democratic backsliding that Turkey has been undergoing under the AKP regime coupled with 
its tenuous economic situation have caused many within the EU to call for an end to membership 
talks with Turkey (Reilhac 2019). Whether or not they become a member of the bloc anytime soon 
doesn’t change the fact that the EU is viewed by many to be the logical next step towards Europe 




The national identity of the Turkish people has been defined by what sets them apart from 
those around them. Their unique geographical position situates them at the doorstep of Europe and 
the very beginning of what is considered the Middle East, helping to create a culture that is not 
wholly encapsulated by any region. The long Turkish history of empire, conquest, upheaval 
created a sense of pride in the Turkish ethnicity and identity. The modernization efforts of Ataturk 
helped further differentiate Turkish people from Persians, Arabs, and Europeans. Their shared 
history, culture, religious identity, and language have all created a distinct national identity that 
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has becoming a rallying point for Turkish nationalists under Erdogan’s regime. Being defined 
largely in contrast and opposition to the Arabic world has also contributed greatly to the anti-
Syrian sentiment that can be observed in Turkey today. 
 
  
   74 
8.0 The Turkish Economic Dimension 
 
 
 As with the previous section on economics, this section will now diverge from the 
qualitative analysis of the previous sections on Turkey in order to provide a quantitative analysis 
of the economic aspect of Turkish nationalism. The structure will be largely similar to the section 
on France with a few sections modified. Firstly, the Turkish economy will be compared in size 
and strength to the French economy to provide context for the financial situation in each case 
study. Next, as with France, a section will be dedicated to the nationalist rhetoric based in 
economic fears that appears in Turkey. This includes both their impact on employment and their 
perceived effect on social safety nets. A discussion of the Turkish governments employment 
policies will also shed light on the early actions taken by the state to integrate migrants and the 
nationalist backlash experienced afterwards. Then, an analysis of recent Turkish policies on 
migrant movement within Turkey and its economic consequences will be discussed. The goal of 
this chapter, as with the French economic section, is to develop an understanding of the rhetoric 
and logic put forth by nationalist groups in Turkey and then to compare this constructed version 
of the economy with the economic realities of Turkey. What this analysis shows is that, just as 
with the French example, the economic rhetoric surrounding Syrian refugees is based in 
misconceptions, and the protectionist policies crafted around this misinformation hurt both Turkish 
citizens and Syrian refugees.  
8.1 Turkey’s Economy vs. France’s Economy 
 
 
For several decades Turkey has been attempting to gain membership in the European Union 
(Reilhac, 2019). They have attempted to rein in their debt to GDP ratio, tried to prove that they 
believe in the same humanitarian and social norms as other members of the bloc, and have tried to 
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present themselves as a beacon of stable democracy (Reilhac, 2019). Over time they have had 
varying levels of success with these programs and have subsequently moved closed and further 
away from being accepted. Much of this progress has been undone however under the rule of 
President Erdogan, who many believe is trying to serve as a pseudo-theocratic dictator (Reilhac, 
2019). In addition to the democratic backslide that Turkey is experiencing, it is also having rather 
severe economic troubles. In 2018, Turkey experienced a national debt and currency crisis that 
many economists worried would set in motion the next global financial crisis (Goodman, 2018). 
While there are many contributing factors to this debt crisis, the main factors have been attributed 
to high inflation, overborrowing from the national government, and high levels of loan defaults 
(Goodman, 2018). Many of these problems were initiated as Erdogan continued to centralize 
power under the executive branch in a very authoritarian manner and began passing and enforcing 
questionable interest rates and borrowing policies (Goodman, 2018). Additionally, economists 
point to Turkey’s long-standing trend of having low savings rates built in to their national budget 
(Goodman, 2018). This leaves them without many resources during times of financial decline, and 
leaves them unable to fund large mitigation programs during times of crisis (Goodman, 2018). 
So, while France and Turkey are both nominally “European” states, they exist with very 
different economic situations. The next part of this section will elaborate on key economic metrics 
in Turkey to develop a clear picture of the quantitative differences between France and Turkey. A 
comparison of these two case studies can be used to show both the similarities and differences 
between the potential economic motivations of nationalist groups and their supporters.  
Turkey’s total GDP as of 2018 was $771.35 Billion with a total national population of 82 
million people (World Bank Turkey, 2020). Compare this to France’s total GDP of $2.8 Trillion 
in 2018 with a total national population of 67 million people (World Bank France, 2020). This 
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highlights a major difference in the economic strength of the two economies. The GDP per capita 
further highlights the economic disparity between these two countries. In 2018, Turkey had a GDP 
per capita of $9,370 (World Bank France, 2020). Compare this to France’s GDP per capita in 2018 
of $41,463 (World Bank France, 2020). It is important to note that the difference in these metrics 
does not immediately mean that Turkey should be viewed as an impoverished state. These metrics 
and others simply highlight that there is a vast difference in the economic strength of these 
countries. Another important distinction can be found in the OECD’s classification of these two 
case studies. While France has the classification of a “High Income” state, Turkey does not have 
this same designation putting it in a different qualitative category (France OECD, 2019). This 
serves as another metric to distinguish Turkey from France. What this difference indicates is that 
France has more financial resources available for the influx of refugees and has an economic 
situation that is more forgiving to an influx of people who need social services and state assistance 
as they resettle. The number of migrants and their impact on the social services of Turkey will be 
analyzed in later sections of this chapter. Now, with a firm understanding of the economic strength 
of Turkey, the next section will discuss the employment situation in Turkey as well as government 
actions taken in an attempt to address the influx of refugees into the country.  
8.2 Employment, Social Safety Nets, and Turkish Resettlement Efforts 
 
 
The general unemployment rate of Turkish adults in 2017 was measured at 13% with youth 
unemployment measured at 19% (Del Carpio, 2018). This makes it higher than many of the 
countries currently members of the European Union including France. As of 2004 35.9% of 
Turkish people were employed in the agricultural sector compared to 4.6% of French citizens in 
the same year (Del Carpio, 2018). Another important aspect of the Turkish labor force is the high 
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number of people who are either self-employed or employed in the informal sector. People who 
are self-employed or who work in the informal sector receive less government protections and may 
receive fewer benefits than those employed in organized corporations and formal businesses (Del 
Carpio, 2018). The relationship between this specific facet of the economy and nationalism is that 
these types of jobs are much more vulnerable to being undercut by migrant workers and refugees. 
The low skill requirements of the agricultural sector and the informal job sector mean that it is 
more likely that employers would hire foreign laborers and a cheaper rate than native workers. 
This adds to the fears of the already anxious Turkish workforce who continue to weather high 
unemployment rates and the fallout of the 2018 currency crisis.  
The sheer scope of the refugee crisis in Turkey has also been a cause for alarm amongst 
the native population. In 2018, there were approximately 3.3 million displaced Syrians living in 
refugee camps and Turkish cities, making it the largest single recipient of refugees in Europe and 
the Middle East (Del Carpio, 2018).  With its already struggling economy and its relatively small 
national budget, Turkey was quickly overwhelmed by the number of people seeking asylum. 
During a public address, Erdogan attempted to highlight the feeling of isolation of overburdening 
that many of Turkish people felt. He stated that “we are the ones who feed 3 million refugees” 
(Karadeniz, 2016). While this makes for a good sound bite, it does not reflect the reality of the 
situation. While Turkey does bear much of the physical cost of housing 3 million people, and a 
portion of the economic costs as well, the international community has also provided significant 
aid to Turkey. The United Nations, European Union, and many non-governmental organizations 
have provided resources and capital to help Turkey.  In order to provide aid to the Turkish state as 
well as prevent refugees from entering into the European bloc, the European Union struck a deal 
with Turkey that would provide financial support to Turkey if they agreed to continuing hosting 
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the vast majority of refugees within their state borders (Ingleby, 2019). While this influx of capital 
helped temporarily, Erdogan wanted increased support from the European Union as the EU slowly 
increased restrictions for new migrants entering the bloc (Ingleby, 2019). As fewer and fewer 
asylum seekers were being admitted into the EU, and more continued to enter Turkey, Erdogan 
stated that Turkey would no longer be a “refugee camp for the European Union” (Farooq, 2019). 
Before this escalation in nationalist sentiment, the Turkish government itself had taken steps to 
address the economic challenges posed by the growing numbers of migrants.  
In an attempt to calm the fears of the people and to alleviate the burden placed on state 
enterprises by the refugee population, the Turkish government enacted policies allowing Syrian 
refugees to seek work in the formal sector even going as far as to grant the formal work permits 
(Del Carpio, 2018). The goal of the program was to allow Syrians to gain financial independence 
and decrease reliance on social services provided by the state and other non-governmental 
organizations (Del Carpio, 2018). While these initiatives have been praised by the international 
community as being progressive, overtime the reaction of the Turkish people and Erdogan’s 
administration to the growing numbers of refugees has devolved into protectionist and xenophobic 
policies.  
8.3 Shifting Policies and the Rise of Economic Nationalism 
 
 
As the number of refugees entering Turkey continued to rise and the mediation efforts 
taken by Turkey, the EU, and international organizations struggled to tackle a humanitarian crisis 
of this size, there was a very distinct shift in the policies of Erdogan’s administration. The 
economic costs of hosting 3 million foreign nationals was beginning to incite mass demonstrations 
and protests against the acceptance of any further refugees (Ingleby, 2019). These protests have 
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come both from organized political factions in Turkey, such as smaller nationalist parties, as well 
as popular uprisings formed by citizens dissatisfied with perceived government inaction on the 
migrant crisis (Farooq, 2019). One of the first actions taken by Erdogan’s government was to 
restrict the movement of migrants within Turkey itself. The goal of this policy was two-fold: firstly 
to limit the amount of people entering Turkey to use it solely as an intermediary on their journey 
to Europe, and to allow the government to equally disperse the existing populations of refugees 
(Economist, 2019). One major unintended consequence of this is that restricting the movement of 
refugees also restricts the access to labor for certain areas of the country. Rural provinces that rely 
on agriculture as their main economic output require young people to serve as laborers (Del Carpio, 
2018). These provinces received the fewest refugees as part of this resettlement program. 
Meanwhile, the already congested cities continue to host the majority of refugees further 
increasing tensions between native Turks and Syrian migrants resulting in unrest and protests as 
described above (Farooq, 2019).  
The most dramatic change in policy from Ankara has been the forced deportation of Syrian 
refugees. Against the advice of the UN, EU, and many other international organizations, Turkish 
authorities have begun sending thousands of Syrians back to Syria (Farooq, 2019). Erdogan’s 
government explained the policy by saying Turkey does not have the resources to support a refugee 
population of this size for the long term (Farooq, 2019). This couples with increased restrictions 
on migration into Europe, means that more and more refugees are stuck in Turkey permanently 
(Economist, 2019). The state sponsored deportations have also served to amplify the xenophobic 
sentiment in Turkey. Since the implementation of these polices, many nationalist groups have seen 
them as signals from the government that refugees aren’t welcome and have embraced this 
messaging (Farooq, 2019). Smaller nationalist parties have openly supported AKP and their 
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initiatives furthering strengthening the voting bloc that Erdogan controls (Soz, 2019). An increase 
in mass demonstrations against further acceptance of refugees as well as increase pressure on the 
government to take steps to close the borders have been observed throughout Turkey (Farooq, 
2019). These actions taken by Turkey have caused further tensions between Erdogan’s government 
and the leadership of the European Union and the EU has responded by ending membership talks 




Economic rhetoric is a mainstay of nationalist movements around the globe. Whether in 
France or Turkey, the accusations made against refugee populations regarding stealing jobs or 
burdening social services appear in the rhetoric of nationalists in both countries. The key 
differences between these two cases studies is the impact that the refugee crisis has had on both of 
these countries and the actions taken in response to the refugees. While France has had to deal 
with a growing refugee population, it is nothing compared to the millions of Syrians who now 
reside in camps in Turkey. Additionally, much of the nationalistic rhetoric has manifested in the 
Rassemblement National who, for the time being, do not possess much power in the national 
government. In Turkey, the party in control of the national and many municipal level governments 
are the ones espousing the xenophobic and nationalistic rhetoric. Additionally, while they 
attempted to integrate the Syrians into the labor force and provide asylum, this shifting into 
enacting policies and programs that have been condemned by the international community. 
Limited internal movement and forced deportations show the dangerous end result of economically 
based nationalism. These programs have continued to make a bad situation worse and have caused 
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damage to Turkey, Syria, and most importantly the people who have been displaced by the Syrian 
Civil War and the ongoing conflicts in Syria.  





The Syrian Refugee Crisis has presented the international community with a humanitarian 
crisis on a scale not seen in decades. Millions of Syrians have been displaced from their homes 
and have sought refuge in countries across the Middle East and Europe (Koroutchev, 2016). While 
the governments of the world have made efforts to provide asylum and resettle these refugees, 
there efforts have been threatened by a corresponding rise in nationalism around the globe. 
Nationalism is a term that is notoriously difficult not only to define but also to analyze. 
Understanding the origins and contributing factors of various nationalistic movements throughout 
history has been often been a struggle for political scientists, sociologists, and politicians. This 
holds true for this contemporary study of nationalism as well. The working definition of 
nationalism and nationalistic movements utilized in this thesis are based on the works of political 
theorists and philosophers who have attempted to understand what defines a nation and what 
creates nationalism. Most notably is the work of Benedict Anderson in his work Imagined 
Communities. From these works the nation came to be defined as a synthesis of shared cultural 
history, religion, language, and other social factors that form a common national identity used to 
define an “in” group and an “out” group (Anderson, 1983). With this definition, two case studies 
were selected for analysis based on their unique political, social, and economic factors: France and 
Turkey. The qualitative and quantitative approach used in this analysis has provided insights that 
a singular cause alone cannot explain. Something as complex and ambiguous as nationalism needs 
to be attacked from multiple angles. 
 The particular case studies discussed act as good micro-examples of a trend that is 
happening on the macro scale. The Syrian refugee crisis has caused an uptick in nationalist 
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sentiment in Europe that aligns with an uptick in nationalist sentiment around the world. France 
and Turkey present us with two countries similar in geography and who are both dealing with the 
same event, the Syrian Refugee Crisis, but in very different ways. The political, cultural, and 
economic differences between these two states provides some insight into how nationalism 
develops in isolation and in different environments. France is a Western democracy with a semi-
presidential system, with a history of poor assimilation polices, that exists as an economic 
powerhouse within the Single Market and upon the world stage (World Bank France, 2020). 
Turkey contrasts this by being an increasingly authoritarian presidential system, with a unique 
imperial history of governance, and a struggling economy that makes financial security a top 
concern. A central topic of exploration in this thesis is also the differences in religious 
demographics of each state and how this may act as a contributing or mitigating factor to nationalist 
sentiment. France is a majority Christian country with a negative relationship with the Muslim 
world for most of its history. Turkey on the other hand is a majority Sunni Muslim country that, at 
the height of its imperial powers, governed territories that practiced many different sects of Islam 
and other religions. The similarities between France and Turkey as well as their differences is what 
makes them case studies perfectly suited for this type of multi-dimensional examination. Further 
discussion of the valuable insights they revealed will take place later in this section. 
 The fundamental question at the heart of this discussion is why did these movements re-
emerge now and in reaction to the Syrian Refugee crisis? To answer this, many varying sources of 
data and methods of analysis were used to develop a comprehensive picture of the current political, 
economic, and social situations in each of these countries. This then allowed for discussion of how 
each of these contributes to the voting patterns and socio-political trends witnessed in recent 
elections. What was revealed is that it is the unique national identities created over the centuries 
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in each of the countries weaponized by the charismatic and powerful leaders of the budding 
nationalist movements who used misinformation, fear mongering, and xenophobic ideologies to 
present Syrian refugees as outsiders and enemies of “the nation.” This fear of the “out group” has 
in turn been used to motivate supporters and gain power for themselves. A review and final 
synthesis of the evidence used and arguments made is detailed below. 
9.1 The Role of Leadership and Parties 
 
 
Without a centralized political authority, nationalist movements would be unable to coalesce 
into any meaningful body, which is why nationalist parties and their leaders have proved so 
effective and so devastating and developing nationalist movements and creating discriminatory 
policies. In both of these case studies, the leaders analyzed had either created or directly inherited, 
their political parties for the sole purpose of achieving individual power. The method by which 
both Le Pen and Erdogan have chosen to achieve this goal is to rally supporters through 
xenophobic and nationalist ideologies, specifically capitalizing on the uncertainty and chaos 
created by the Syrian refugee crisis to gain public support. The personal connection between each 
of these leaders and their party also reflects the personal nature of nationalist movements. An “Us 
vs. Them” mentality motivates members of the imagined nation to support the leader who presents 
themselves as the protector and savior of the nation.  
In France, the impact that Marine Le Pen and her party Rassemblement National have had on 
shifting the political landscape and discourse around migration into France was clearly presented. 
Inheriting the organizational structure of Front National from her father, Le Pen has rebranding 
and reformed the party’s platform to capitalize on the surging wave of islamophobia that have 
emerged in France after a series of terrorist attacks in the last decade (Stockemer, 2017). She has 
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concentrated and weaponized the fear and uncertainty of the French populace by giving them a 
series of scapegoats and targets upon which to unload their frustrations. Whether it is the EU, the 
Syrians, or the ever present “Elites” Le Pen has single handedly defined the far-right and nationalist 
movements throughout France, and has used the timing of the Syrian Refugee Crisis as fuel for 
the meteoric rise of Rassemblement National.  
In Turkey, Erdogan has proved himself to be an equally proficient orator and manipulator of 
the people. Finding his first supporters amongst conservative Islamic groups in Turkey, Erdogan 
and his Justice and Development Party have used their platform as the ruling regime to create 
policies and ideologies of exclusion towards the 3.3 million Syrians currently in Turkey (Ingleby, 
2019). Erdogan has modified his more radical Islamic message to appeal more to Turkish people’s 
sense of national identity and pride to present himself as the leader of the nation and protector of 
the people from this ever-growing foreign threat (Farooq, 2019). The policies passed by his 
government have been directly detrimental to the refugees in Turkey as well as fostering a growing 
anti-immigrant sentiment within the country (Farooq, 2019). The more he continues to coalesce 
power and support of the people through his nationalistic measures, the more authoritarian he and 
his party become (Eder, 2016). Like Le Pen, Erdogan is the chief architect of his party’s platform 
and has single handedly crafted its message of the Turkish nation vs. the Syrians for his own 
personal and political gain.  
Both of these leaders and their parties have defined the modern nationalist movements that can 
be observed today and this paper clearly demonstrated the path that they as individuals took to 
achieve this goal. Yet, much of the rhetoric and ideology that they utilize was not developed 
uniquely for their movements but rather is based in centuries old ideas about the national identity 
within each country and the concept of who belongs in “the nation.” 
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9.2 The Role of National Identities and the Imagined Nation 
 
 
The chapters on the role of leadership in each case study highlighted Le Pen and Erdogan’s 
ability to effectively rally people to their nationalist cause and to effectively organize the fear and 
hatred of those movements into effective political bodies. The ideologies that they used within 
their rhetoric is not something that they as individuals created specifically for those movements 
but rather it is a weaponization and distortion of long-standing notions of what it means to “be 
French” or to “be Turkish.” That is why an extensive historical analysis on the development of 
each case studies respective national identity was done in order to develop an understanding of 
how citizens within each of those countries view themselves in contrast to citizens of any other 
country. The history highlighted in each chapter is the same history highlighted in schools that is 
then used to define what it means to be part of that particular nation-state. This is comparable to 
the teaching of American history in schools, and how this history is used to convey the values and 
ideologies central to the United States of America. By themselves these historical trends and 
patterns are not harmful or damaging, but nationalist movements in France and Turkey have 
hijacked these stories in order to shape exclusionary identities that can be used to rally support for 
their various causes.  
The French identity has been shaped by its reputation as a unique nation on the multi-cultural 
continent of Europe and as a leader on the world stage. Its central values are reflected in its 
complicated relationship with religion over the years and its identity as the inheritors of the French 
revolution (Horne, 2004). The proud heritage of the French language makes it a central component 
of the French national identity, and people proudly point to Laïcité as a policy that promotes 
assimilation, secularism, and religious harmony. These factors have not been hijacked by RN and 
by using a distorted narrative and playing on the pre-existing discriminatory tendencies of French 
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society, they have created an exclusionary national identity that puts Syrian refugees and most 
immigrants firmly outside membership in the French nation (Piser, 2019).   
The Turkish identity has been shaped by centuries of empire, conquest, and preservation of the 
unique Turkish culture. Their own traditions of westernization and secularization, begun by 
Atatürk, have now been used as justification for discrimination against refugees who are viewed 
as backwards and uncivilized (Kirdis, 2015). In order to grow the power and influence of his 
government, Erdogan has utilized the Turkish people’s concept of their national identity in order 
to again create and exclusionary idea of who belongs in Turkey and what it means to be Turkish.  
National identities have existed for as long as people have organized themselves into nations. 
There is an unavoidable human tendency to define the group that one belongs to in contrast to 
other groups around it. Whether this is legal definitions, or social definitions, these identities have 
existed and will continue to exist. What these chapters contributed to this general discussion of 
nationalism is the distortion of the idea of national identity to fit nationalistic propaganda. These 
identities were not only used as labels but now served as barriers and things that had to be defended 
from external threats. Syrian refugees were presented as existential threats to the nations of France 
and Turkey and had to be physically forced out as in Turkey, or politically excluded, as was 
advocated in France (Ingleby, 2019). This dynamic again highlights the influence that information 
and the presentation of facts have on the power of nationalist movements. The ways that Syrians 
refugees have been presented in both of these cases was deliberately crafted to show them as 
outsiders and threats to the national identities that Erdogan and Le Pen have crafted. Nothing 
highlights the power of misinformation more than the economic rhetoric and policies developed 
by the nationalist parties in France and Turkey.  
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9.3 The Role of Economic Rhetoric 
 
 
Nationalism is at its core based on fear, fear of the other, fear of the outsider; and nothing is 
scarier than the idea that someone else is coming for your job, your home, your livelihood. That is 
why nationalist parties and leaders focus so much of their policy and rhetoric on the perceived 
economic threat that migrants pose and Le Pen and Erdogan are no different. Both have utilized 
misinformation and people’s base fears to create power movements of nationalism in their states. 
The chapters on economics broke down the rhetoric and showed that not only is it not based in 
reality, but the policies put forward by Le Pen and Erdogan had the capacity to do more harm to 
the citizens of their own country than any imagined Syrian threat.  
With the French example there is a plethora of economic data. Spending data, taxation 
schemes, revenues generated, employment statistics and much more was gathered from the French 
government, the OECD, and World Bank. What this analysis revealed is that France is performing 
quite well. Its unemployment has decreased steadily over the past decade and the GDP per capita 
is on the rise. This suggests that perhaps many of the economic concerns voiced by nationalist 
supporters are not based in any reality but rather an imagined perception of the country. In her 
party platform published in 2016, Marine Le Pen extensively discusses measures to limit the ability 
of non-French citizens to access state resources such as healthcare and un-employment benefits 
(Rassemblement National, 2016). Many of the concerns she raises are not problems that are 
actually happening or are happening on a rather insignificant scale. With regards to the loss of 
jobs, France has a highly formalized employment sector with extremely intrusive state regulation 
and monitoring. This largely precludes undocumented immigrants or refugees from taking 
competitive jobs without proper identification and documentation. This reflects a direct attempt 
by nationalist parties to conjure up fear amongst the population. Complaints about taxation, EU 
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migrants taking jobs, and stagnant wages were professed as the primary motivations of nationalist 
movements. But many of these concerns too are not based in fact, rather are just perpetuated within 
in these resistance movements.  
 Here again Turkey stands out as an effective counter to what is witnessed in France. While 
France stands out as strong economic player on the world stage, many economists have noted that 
the uncertain economic situation in Turkey could potentially be ground zero for the next economic 
crisis (Goodman, 2019). Another stark difference is the large informal labor sector that exists in 
Turkey. This makes it much easier for undocumented people to obtain employment which can be 
viewed as a challenge or threat to Turkish citizens (Del Carpio, 2018). Due to its economic distress, 
Turkey also has less state resources at its disposal further exacerbating people’s concerns about 
migrants who do not pay taxes stealing precious state resources. The perceptions of an individual’s 
economic situation coupled with the level of state spending on resettlement programs have been 
shown to be some of the most impactful contributing factors amongst nationalist voters. 
What analysis of both of these countries and the economic rhetoric of their nationalist 
movements show is again that these movements are based more in a xenophobic and racist fantasy 
that in any quantitative reality. By taking advantages of the genuine concern and economic 
suffering of their citizens, these nationalist groups serve only to empower themselves at the cost 
of their citizens well-being and the well-being of the Syrian migrants they have painted as 
scapegoats.  
9.4 Final Discussion and Future Research 
 
 
What this paper has highlighted through its diverse and in-depth analysis is that nationalism, 
like many political phenomena, is not a simple cause and effect relationship. There are several 
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contributing factors from many different aspects of life that coalesce together and cause an 
individual or group of people to support nationalist polices. A central theme that has been identified 
through this discussion is the power of “in group” and “out group” dynamics that have presented 
the Syrian Refugee Crisis as an “Us vs. Them” zero sum game. To cultivate nationalist support, 
leaders and parties must cultivate a sense of fear and uncertainty and then provide a scapegoat as 
the target for people’s frustrations. Each chapter has shown how the nationalist movements in 
France and Turkey has weaponized peoples fear and uncertainty surrounding the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis, creating clear concepts of “the nation” in contrast to “the other”, in order to gain support 
for their political movements. Ultimately. this helps explain the sudden rise in nationalism has 
been observed throughout Europe and the Middle East. To combat this governments can take a 
more hands on approach to integration and assimilation as well as taking measures to counter the 
spread of fear mongering and misinformation. If people understand the true causes for their 
situations and understand the true ideals of their nations, this can help reduce the potential damage 
done by nationalism. 
The major policy prescription that can be derived from the conclusions of this thesis is the 
importance of government communication in combatting misinformation and fear. In times of 
crisis it is crucial that the central government can effectively provide clear and accurate 
information to the people. Any lapse in leadership or mixed messaging leaves gaps of confusion 
that can be harnessed and weaponized by other groups to serve their own ends. The Syrian Refugee 
Crisis is a humanitarian disaster on a scale not seen in almost a century. The mixed signaling and 
perceived lack of action from key leaders in Europe left room for nationalists to develop rhetoric 
based in misinformation that has stoked the fears of the populace and won them popular support. 
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In the future, governments of the world must make fact-based communication their first priority 
in handling crises so they can maintain the trust of the people and maintain support for their efforts.  
Future exploration into exact policy initiatives can help translate the research of this paper into 
actual policy initiatives that can help end this wave of nationalism and hopefully prevent future 
waves from emerging. This is no small task but understanding the roots of this dangerous trend is 
the first step in developing prescriptive policy recommendations that can help address it. 
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